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INTRODUCTION
Traditional Indian society understood itself as a complex of responsibili-
ties and duties. The [Indian Civil Rights Act of the United States]
merely transposed this belief into a society based on rights against gov-
t © B.Comin., LL.B. (Cape Town), LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard). Professor of Law, Dal-
housie Law School, Canada; Bora Laskin National Fellow. This article, on Native concep-
tions of justice, is part of an extensive investigation into the transformation of rights.
For the philosophical and methodological aspect of this approach see LEON E. TRAKMAN &
SEAN GATiEN, RIGHTs AND RESPoNSmILTEs (forthcoming 1997). For preliminary analyses,
see Leon E. Trakman, Transforming Free Speech: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 Omo
ST. LJ. 899 (1995); Leon E. Trakman & Sean Gatien, Rights and Values in the Abortion
Debate: A Rights" Metamorphosis, 14 THE WINDsoR YEARBOOK ON AcCESS TO JusTicE 420
(1995). This article benefitted from comments received from Alan Brownstein, David
Beatty, Patti Doyle-Bedwell, Daniel Farber, Stanley Fish, Stuart Gilby, Martin Golding
and Beverly Moran and the editorial assistance of Sean Gatien, Ray Maccallum and Ter-
rance Sheppard. Funding for this study was provided by the Social Sciences and Hu-
manities Research Council (SSHRCC) and the Department of Justice, Canada.
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ernment and eliminated any sense of responsibility that the people
might have felt for one another.n '
One mainstay of Western Liberal Society is the belief that
individual rights are fundamental to our democratic way of life
and that the State is duty bound to protect them. As Ronald
Dworkin once remarked, "[T]he language of rights now domi-
nates political debate in the United States."2 Rights serve as the
girders of liberal society. They protect the individual's inviolable
space; they preserve her human dignity, liberty and freedom
from encroachment by others.
Several implications arise from this conception of rights.
One implication is that, where the rights of one individual end,
the rights of another begin. Robert Bork pronounced, "what a
court adds to one person's constitutional rights, it subtracts
from the rights of others."3 Another implication is that, to pro-
1. VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF
AMERIcAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 213 (1984). See also The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
2. RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1977). Jeremy Waldron
elaborates:
The idea that political morality and social choice are to be based wholly or
partly on some account of the rights of the human individual is a familiar
theme in Western politics.... [If "the end in view of every political association
is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man", then gov-
ernments must be set up and constitutions structured in such a way that it be-
comes impossible for individual rights to be pushed aside for the sake of the
private interests of those in power or even in pursuit of other social goals and
aspirations.
Jeremy Waldron, Introduction to THEORIES OF RIGHTS 1 (1984) (quoting The Declaration
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, art. H). On the liberal philosophy underlying this
approach, see infra Part U1. For critical commentary on liberal conceptions of liberty, see
Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 PoL. THEORY 315 (1984); C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE
(1962).
3. Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 877, 904 n.49
(1989) (quoting Linda Greenhouse, The Bork Battle: Visions of the Constitution, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1987, § 4, at 1). During Robert Bork's confirmation hearings to the United
States Supreme Court, Bork was asked by Senator Paul Simon whether he still believed
that statement. "Well yes, Senator," Bork replied, "I think it's a matter of plain arithme-
tic." Id. Senator Simon responded to this statement as follows: "I have long thought it to
be fundamental in our society that when you expand the liberty of any of us, you expand
the liberty of all of us." Id. at 905 n.49 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Court Nominee Clar-
ifies How He Differs From Bork, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 14, 1988, at A27). This conflict between
Bork and Simon belies a divide within American political and legal thought in which
Bork represents the traditional liberal view, while Simon presents a more organic and
community-oriented view. Republican strands of thought in American liberalism frus-
trate attempts to choose between these two positions. See, eg., Suzanna Sherry, Respon-
sible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 CHI. L. REV. 131, 132 (1995).
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vide each individual with her own private space, all individuals
must be accorded the same space, including, the same rights,
such as the right to life, liberty and personal security. In effect,
rights that are good for one must also be good for everyone else.
As a further implication, the State is bound to accord priority to
individual rights over all other social values. The assumption in
a liberal society is that, in securing the greatest amount of free-
dom for each individual, numerous beliefs and values will flour-
ish. Boldly summed up by Robert Nozick, "[i]ndividuals have
rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them
(without violating their rights)."4 In effect, individual rights
trump all other interests.
This conception of individual liberty, ingrained in Western
liberal ideology, affronts people who adhere to different concep-
tions of freedom. Not only does this conception fail to provide all
individuals with the same inviolable space, it affords little space
to cultures that conceive of human dignity, freedom and justice
differently. Such is the case with Native Peoples of the United
States and First Nations Peoples of Canada whose conceptions
of freedom and justice diverge significantly from those ground-
ing Western Liberalism.5
4. ROBERT Nozxc, ANARcHY, STATE AND UTOPIA at ix. (1974). Nozick continues:
So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of
what, if anything, the state and its officials may do ....
Our main conclusions about the state are that a minimal state, limited to
the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of
contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate per-
sons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that
the minimal state is inspiring as well as right.
Id. But see Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Omo ST. L.J.
411 (1981) (criticizing the revival of constitutional law based upon "Grand Theory" as a
method of resolving problems created when interests of different individuals or groups
clash). On the place of community values within liberal legal thought, see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Post-Liberal Juding: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO.
L. Ruv. 293 (1992); Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319
(1992); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. 1, FOUNDATIONS (1991); Linda R.
Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REV. 983
(1990); Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vi-
sion, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (1985).
5. The analysis underpinning this article applies as readily to cultural communities,
other than Native Peoples. However, evaluating the interests of Native Peoples, often re-
ferred to as Aboriginal or First Nations Peoples in Canada, draws upon a significant cul-
tural and political debate over the right of Native Peoples in general to self-
determination. Native Peoples are defined, in Canada's Constitution Act as "includ[ing]
the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada" CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt.
H (Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada), § 35, cl. 2.
Winter 1997]
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These conceptual differences become problematic when lib-
eral conceptions of individual liberty and communal values ad-
hered to by Native Peoples come into conflict, when govern-
ments and courts impose Western conceptions of liberty on
Native Peoples, and when Native Peoples sustain a loss of cul-
tural and political identity as a result. It is on account of con-
flicts between such values that liberal rights talk is most under
fire today. "There can be little doubt that a marked discontent
with rights and 'rights talk' is in the air."6
A narrow conception of rights is contrary, this article main-
tains, not only to the interests of Native Peoples, but to the val-
ues of liberalism itself. The rights of individuals are not imper-
meable membranes that permit the individual to regard no one's
interests but her own. The liberty of the individual is central to
the enrichment of communal life: but it is a liberty that encom-
passes a responsibility towards others, beyond other individuals,
within that life. Such a responsibility embodies the central ten-
ets of liberalism: the enrichment of communal life through the
individual's open-mindedness and tolerance towards others. In
explanatory terms, responsibilities owed to others in the exer-
cise of rights are "the rent we pay for the privilege of living in a
civilized society. They include such familiar virtues as tolerance,
truthfulness, benevolence, patriotism, respect for human and
civil rights, participation in the democratic process, and devo-
tion to the common good 7 They are owed to cultural communi-
ties whose interests are not accorded the status of individual
rights.
Society is most liberal, then, when individuals are respon-
sive to, not isolated from, the communal life of others. It is most
vital when individuals are responsible to take account of the in-
terests of others in the exercise of rights. It is most fair when,
"[c]itizens are no longer simply rights-bearing individuals ....
[but] rather, rights-bearing individuals with responsibilities." 8
Eighty years ago, Wesley Hohfeld presented a structure of
rights in which individuals who had rights were subject to du-
ties toward others who had countervailing rights.9 This article
6. Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DuKE L. 989 (1994); see also
Sherry, supra note 3, at 131-32.
7. Justice Dallin H. Oaks, Rights and Responsibilities, 36 MERCER L. REV. 427, 428
(1985).
8. Sherry, supra note 3, at 132. Sherry adds, "If what is important is not that one
has a right to vote but that one is able to (and does) use it wisely, we have moved our
vision of citizenship from rights alone to... rights and responsibilities." Id.
9. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Rights and Jural Relations, in PmLOSOPHY OF LAW 308 (Joel
Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Rights and Jural Rela-
192 [Vol. 45
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maintains that Hohfeld's schema illustrates limitations within
the structure of liberal rights, but without proposing modifica-
tions to it.1°
The alternative is to develop a conception of responsibility
in which individuals, cultural communities and the State all as-
sume responsibilities to respect the adverse interests of others
that are not protected by countervailing rights." The goal is to
demonstrate that rights are not simply legal advantages that in-
dividuals exercise, sometimes at the expense of others. Rights
are also means towards social cohesion, while responsibilities fa-
cilitate that cohesion.
This conception of responsibility takes account of cultural
otherness, because it recognizes that responsibilities owed to-
ward others inhere in rights themselves. These responsibilities
are different in nature from Hohfeld's duties not to interfere
with the rights of others. Responsibilities arise because the in-
terests of those to whom they are owed are not adequately pro-
tected in law, and because rightholders would be free to ignore
them in the absence of such responsibilities.
Relating rights to responsibilities is also warranted in view
of the threat that, by not according legal protection to important
cultural interests, the liberty of society as a whole is under-
mined. The harm is a failure to realize the full potential of lib-
erty itself.2 Society is most harmed, for example when racists
tion]. See also Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions].
10. On Hohfeld's analysis of legal relationships, see infra Part HA.
11. The conception of a cultural interest adopted in this article approximates, to
some extent, a cultural right, as identified by Adeno Addis as follows:
A cultural right is a group right, for by its very nature, culture is a communion
of its members rather than the sum of the attitudes and life-projects of the va-
rious individuals within the group.... The argument for cultural rights can-
not, therefore, be understood in terms of individual rights. It is within groups
that constitutive narratives... are produced and through groups that sense is
made of the social world.
Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67
NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 615, 658 (1992). Contrary to Adeno Addis, however, this article
maintains that the cultural identity of a group is informed to varying degrees by indi-
vidual identity. See generally CLFF'ORD GEERTz, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973);
El'. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON (1991). Geertz maintains that "culture is public be-
cause meaning is [public]." Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive
Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra.
12. Relating rights to responsibilities is a means of accomplishing this end. On the
need for such an accommodation in societies that are "both multinational and poly-
ethnic, see Will1 Kymlicka, Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity, 4 CAN. J. LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE 239, 240 (1991). For expanding liberal conceptions of rights to take
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use their speech rights to disadvantage Native Americans whose
interests are not protected by countervailing rights. The targets
of that speech currently are protected only if their rights impose
duties upon the racist speakers, when the latter violate a duty
not to defame, libel or slander identifiable Native Persons or
bands. 13 The only other restriction upon such speech rights
arises when the State discourages expression that threatens so-
cial interests that are not adequately protected by rights. For
example, the State may constrain racist expression that is vio-
lent, or that threatens national security or public safety.14
The prevailing conception of rights and duties is clearly in-
sufficient to satisfy the needs of this example. Constraining
rights only in respect of interests that constitute rights fails to
redress the important interests of Native Peoples that are not
treated as rights. For example, hatemongers who have the duty
to respect the right not to be slandered, have no duty to respect
Native interests that vary from rights, such as an interest in
preserving a cultural heritage. Being external to the
hatemonger's right and not themselves being the subject of a
countervailing right, those interests remain unprotected in law.
A responsibility, in contrast, imposes an internal restriction
upon a right. The hatemonger's right itself renders him respon-
sible to respect Native interests that are detrimentally affected
by the exercise of that right. This is regardless of whether the
cultural interests of Native Peoples are treated as liberal rights
themselves. This approach can impede liberal right-holders, not
limited to hatemongers, from using their rights as unfettered
trump cards to usurp the cultural interests of Native Peoples. It
can also insure that rights serve as instruments of social cooper-
ation between Western liberal and Native communities. Here,
responsibilities owed to Native Peoples are not only different in
nature from duties not to interfere with the rights of others.
They arise because the cultural interests of Native Peoples are
not adequately protected in law, and because right-holders oth-
erwise would be free to ignore those interests in the absence of
such responsibilities attendant upon the exercise of rights. As
account of cultural diversity, see J. Jean Burnet, Multiculturalism, Immigration and Ra-
cism: A Comment on the Canadian Immigration and Political Study, 7 CAN, ETHNIc
STUD. 35 (1975); Evelyn Kallen, Multiculturalism, Minorities, and Motherhood. A Social
Scientific Critique of Section 27, in MVIu ULTUmmuSM AND THE CHARTER 123-37 (Cana-
dian Human Rights Found. ed., 1987).
13. For arguments on this duty, see Leon E. Trakman, Transforming Free Speech:
Rights and Responsibilities, 56 Omo ST. LJ. 899, 920-38 (1995).
14. For the regulation of "communist speech" in the 1950's on grounds of national
security, see id. at 904 n.28.
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Amitai Etzioni aptly suggested, adapting Western Liberalism to
accommodate non-liberal values and interests "is not a call for
curbing rights. On the contrary, strong rights presume strong
responsibilities"15
This article focuses on, among other issues, the rights and
interests of Native Peoples in land. Serious conflict continues to
brew between governments and specific Native Peoples over the
division of land, sometimes leading to violent confrontation. Fur-
ther conflict persists between mining, lumber and oil exploration
companies, among others, and Native Peoples over the use of
land.16 Recently, some governments and corporations, conscious
of past injustices towards Native Peoples in the resolution of
these conflicts, have sought more creative and equitable means
of accommodating the interests of Native Peoples. 17 These ef-
forts, grounded in Western conceptions of liberty, have failed to
redress important Native interests that are subordinated to lib-
eral rights.
The call for reconceiving of Western liberal conceptions of
rights in light of responsibilities does not amount to a rejection
of liberal values. On the contrary, it is an entreaty for increas-
ing the social and legal responsibilities that are properly attend-
ant upon Western liberal rights. Liberal society is most robust
15. AirmI ETzoNI, THE SPIRIT OF COmeuNrrY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBMES, AND THE
CoMmuNITAIAN AGENDA 1 (1993) (emphasis added). The thesis here is that the nature
and extent of responsibilities are contingent upon the context, including the nature of
the right and the interest upon which it impacts. It follows that there may be strong
rights and weak responsibilities, as well as the converse. On expanding conceptions of
rights to include community values, see LEON TRAKAN REASONING WITH THE CHARTER
ch. 2 (1991); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Iden-
tity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303 (1986); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality and Community: Lessons
from the Civil Rights Era, 56 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 183, 186-87 (1980); David Sugarman,
The Legal Boundaries of Liberty: Dicey, Liberalism and Legal Science, 46 MOD. L REv.
102 (1983) (reviewing RIcHARD A. COSGROVE, THE RuLE OF LAW: ALBERT VENN DmEY, VIC-
TORiAN JuRmsT (1980)).
16. A current example is the large nickel deposit which Diamond Fields Resources
Inc. has discovered in Voisey Bay in Northern Labrador, land the Inuit and Innu claim
they have used for thousands of years. A more well-known example is the Quebec Gov-
ernment's proposal to build a hydroelectric project in Northern Quebec that would drain
into James Bay, flooding land traditionally used by the Cree and Inuit. A final, striking
example is the armed stand-off by the Mohawks in Oka, Quebec that resulted when it
was proposed that a golf course be extended into lands sacred to the Mohawk people as
a burial site. On this conflict at Oka, see GEOFFREY YORK & LOREEN PwnDERA, PEOPLE OF
THE PINES: THE WARIoRs AND THE LEGACY OF OKA (1992).
17. This accommodation of Native interests within an otherwise Western Liberal
value system is evident in co-management schemes established between government and
corporations on the one hand and Native communities on the other. On such schemes,
see infra Part W.B.
Winter 1997] 195
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
when it is expressive, not repressive of cultural difference. It is
most telling when those who claim membership in it acknowl-
edge the interests of those who traditionally have been subju-
gated by it.
II. LIBERAL CONCEPTIONS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
[E]very Man hath ... [a] Natural Freedom, without being subjected to
the Will or Authority of any other Man .... 18
Western liberal constitutions traditionally protect only the
liberty of the individual, leaving the members of communities
with no more liberty than they possess as individuals. So con-
ceived, such constitutions allow a community of Native Peoples
to have rights and liberties only when the individuals within it
have those rights. The community itself has no distinct rights
over and above the aggregate of individual rights. The whole
community is never greater than the sum of its parts.
This individual conception of liberty is grounded in deonto-
logical and teleological theory. Deontological reasoning holds
that liberty inheres in the individual as an end in itself. It is
"the Kantian right of each individual to be treated as an end in
himself," rather than as a means towards an end. 19 Founded
upon natural law rhetoric,20 the assumption is that individual
rights speak for themselves, independently of their cultural ef-
fect.21 Teleological reasoning assumes that the liberty of the in-
18. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 322 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967).
19. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, in
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 229, 233 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
For historical argument in support of this proposition, see Immanuel Kant, On the Com-
mon Saying: "This May be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice", in KANT's
PoLrncAL WmTiNrs 73-74, 80 (Hans S. Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970).
20. For an excellent discussion of the natural law roots of Western liberal and legal
thought, see Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Consti-
tutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993).
21. In deontological reasoning, individual liberty is innate or inherent. See, e.g.,
JOHN RAWLs; A THEORY OF JUSTICE 31-33 (1971); RONALD DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCI-
PLE 353-63 (1985). The moral roots of classical liberalism are that it can consistently be
maintained that it is intrinsically wrong to repress the liberty of the individual, and that
the exercise of liberty inheres in that individual, not in the State to allow at its discre-
tion. The moral worth of individual liberty is determined a priori, not after the fact. On
the a priori nature of individual liberty, see MILTON & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE
(1980); FREEDOM IN ARMS (A.L. Morton ed., 1975); STEVEN LURES, INnvmuAmASm (1973);
STUART HAMPSHIRE, FREEDOM OF THE INDIVDUAL (1965); MACPHERSON, supra note 2. On
the libertarian roots of deontological reason, see LUDWIG VON MISES, NATION, STATE, AND
ECONOMY: CONTRuTIoNS To THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF OUR TIME (Leland B. Yeager
trans., 1983); JAMES M. BucHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY (1975); NozicK, supra note 4;
196 [Vol. 45
Winter 1997] ENDING THE DOMINION 197
dividual is determined by the social good, consisting of the sum
of individual needs, desires and preferences. Here, individual
liberty is preserved because it satisfies that good, more so than
for reasons that inhere within it.22
Both deontological and teleological approaches conceive of
liberty as transcending the interests of discrete cultures with
shared attributes. 23 Their assumption is that only individuals
have interests and that protection should not be accorded cul-
tural interests that differ from those of the individual.24 This in-
FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEF, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960). On the relationship be-
tween libertarian thought and liberalism generally, see THE LIBERAL TRADITION: FROM
Fox TO KEYNES (Alan Bullock & Maurice Shock eds., 1956); Gumo DE RUGGiERO, THE
HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (R.G. Collingwood trans., 1959) (1927); ANDREw LE-
VINE, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A CRITIQUE OF ITS THEORY (1981): LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL
TRADITON IN AMERICA (1955); HAROLD J. LASKI, THE RIsE OF EURoPEAN LIBERALISM (2d ed.
1962); LEONARD T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM (1911).
22. This teleological view finds its historical roots in the writings of Aristotle, nota-
bly, in political relations between individual and State. See ARISTOTLE, 1 THE POLITCs OF
AlSromE ch. 2 (J.E.C. Welldon trans., 1883); 3 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE supra chs. 9,
11. Despite efforts to render deontological and teleological reasoning compatible, deonto-
logical reasoning ordinarily is essentialist, while teleological reasoning is contingent. The
result is a potential schism between them: either individual rights are treated as good in
themselves, or as good only when they favor a preferred conception of the good life. On
the maturation of teleological thought in Aristotle's Ethics see MAX HAMBURGER, MORALS
AND LAw: THE GROWTH OF ARISTOTiE'S LEGAL THEORY (1971); W.F.R. Hardie, The Final
Good in Aristotle's Ethics, 40 PHIL. 277 (1965); hIus MURDOCK, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD
(1970).
23. See, ag., Paul Rich, TH. Green, Lord Scarman and the Issue of Ethnic Minority
Rights in English Liberal Thought, 10 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUD. 149 (1987). For critical
commentary on this practice, see Trakman, supra note 13, at 899.
24. According to this liberal thesis, protection is not accorded interests that arise af-
ter the fact and that are grounded in communal values. See HuMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979). But see
Gillian Triggs, The Rights of "Peoples" and Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony? in
THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (J. Crawford ed., 1988); Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court
and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 263 (1986). The rea-
soning applies to, for example, affirmative action programs that protect the pluralistic
rights of individuals. This individuated philosophy applies even to historical milestones
like Brown v. Board of Edua, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). On the philosophical foundations of
affirmative action, see Alec A. Izzo, The Jurisprudence of Affirmative Action: Equality in
Abstraction and Application, 4 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 161 (1992); Burke Marshall, A Com-
ment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation of Minorities", 93 YALE L.J. 1006
(1984); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DUKE L REv. 705; Alan D. Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for
Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988);
Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 120-22 (1970); Martha Mi-
now, Pluralisms, 21 CONN. L. REV. 965, 969-70 (1988-89); MICHAEL REICH, RACIAL INE-
QUALITY. A POLmCAL-EcONOMC ANALYSIS (1981).
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dividuated conception of liberty is apparent in relation to free-
dom of expression. Neither deontological nor teleological
approaches protect the right of distinct cultural communities to
be free from racist expression. Deontological reasoning rational-
izes that protection on grounds that the individual's right to
freedom of expression is sacred in itself.25 Teleologic reasoning
holds that such freedom promotes a marketplace in ideas. 26 Both
assert that freedom of expression is preserved by protecting the
individual's rights, without regard to the normative assessment
of cultural interests beyond her.27 Both subscribe to dual princi-
25. See, eg., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1991 SUi.
CT. REV. 245 (1961). Meiklejohn once wrote: "I must ... speak not for absolutism in all
its forms, but only for my own version of it: Id at 246 n.4. See generally Fried, supra
note 19, at 229; Lyle Denniston, Absolutism: Unadorned, and Without Apology, 81 GEO.
L.J. 351 (1992). But see Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591 (1982); LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTEM.
IST SPEECH iN AMERICA 36-38 (1986); THOMAS IL EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
THE FImS AMENDMENT (1966). On the combination of deontological and teleological argu-,
ments behind the protection of free speech, see Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Rea-
sons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL L. Ray. 95
(1990); Charles R. Lawrence II, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DuR L.J. 431; Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Ra-
cial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982);
Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH L. REv. 2320, 2361-63 (1989).
26. On this free marketplace, here, in the exchange in ideas, see Trakman, supra
note 13, at 899; LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PREss (1985); David A. Ander-
son, The Origins of the Free Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983).
27. This article denotes cultural, as distinct from racial, interests and communities.
This is, in part, on account of the negative stereotyping that ordinarily attaches to deno-
tations of race. Conceiving of communities in cultural, as distinct from racial or ethnic
terms also shifts emphasis away from differences in racial appearance to differences in
social and political values and understandings. This emphasis upon culture also chal-
lenges the false image that, despite the fact that European and Native Peoples have
multitudes of appearances, appearance nevertheless determines race. The alternative is
to recognize that culture serves as a condition of co-existence which unifies distinct peo-
ples and also, serves as a backdrop against which to measure relations within and be-
tween cultural communities. Culture also allows for differences within larger non-
mainstream groups themselves-such as differences within First Nations bands, for ex-
ample cultural differences between the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic and the Haida of the
Queen Charlotte Islands-that classifications based on race otherwise would exclude. Fi-
nally, culture is preferable as a means of self-identification to race, particularly among
mixed cultural communities who likely would be excluded from cultural communities
under a color-identification scheme. At the same time, it is important not to marginalize
culture as a category of discrimination on the ground that past wrongs done by reason of
culture are "unmeasurable" or otherwise are subject to a "mosaic of shifting preferences.!
In this respect, I am wary of denying remedial relief because this belief can be based on
a conception of responsibility that is grounded in the power of government and the
moral claims of the majority. Illustrative of this concern are Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's assertions in City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co.:
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ples which bind everyone. First, each individual has the right to
decide what is good for her, so long as all individuals enjoy the
same right. Second, the manner in which each individual ex-
presses her freedom are her concern in respect of which the
State is neutral. As Robin West reflects:
[N]eutrality is the shared core belief or commitment from which particu-
lar liberal positions on concrete issues, such as affirmative action or
abortion, can follow. While liberals can legitimately disagree over
whether the State should permit abortion or remedy racial discrimina-
tion by use of quotas, liberals cannot disagree over whether or not the
State should remain neutral on the question of what sort of life is the
good life. State neutrality toward the good life is held to be a necessary
and perhaps sufficient condition as well of liberalism.28
The result is that courts avoid attributing a content to the
individual's right to freedom of expression on the basis of the
nature of its enjoyment, or its impact upon others, including
communities of others.29 As Herbert Wechsler elaborated: "a
To accept [the City of] Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone
can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to
competing claims for "remedial relief" for every disadvantaged group. The
dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to per-
sonal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting prefer-
ences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs... We think
such a result would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional
provision whose central command is equality.
City of Richmond v. JAL Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1989). See also Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 621 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149, 180-81 (1987); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 507 (1986). See generally Leon E. Trakman, Substantive Equality in Constitutional
Jurisprudence: Meaning Within Meaning, 7 CAN. J. LAw & JURISPRUDENCE 27, 27-28
(1994); Addis, supra note 11, at 1219; Mary Ellen Turpel, Aboriginal Peoples and the Ca-
nadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES
ON LEGAL THEORY 503 (Richard F. Devlin ed., 1991); Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive
Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1687,
1708 (1986) [hereinafter Substantive Equality]; Michel Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action,
Justice, and Equalities: A Philosophical and Constitutional Appraisal, 46 Omo ST. L.J.
845, 860 (1985); ALAN H. GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REvERSE DISCRnNATION 175-76 (1979).
28. West, supra note 4, at 673.
29. The unwillingness to consider the social, including humanitarian, effects of lib-
eral rights is apparent in judicial thought, notably, among judges who claim to be "neu-
tral" towards the substance of law. The underlying assumption behind such neutrality is
the assertion that rights speak for themselves. On such principled neutrality in constitu-
tional interpretation, see, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ments Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971-72) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles]; Robert
Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WAsH. U.
L.Q. 695. But cf., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 CoLuhL L REv. 809 (1935); Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Func-
tion of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14 ComELL L. Q. 274 (1928-29).
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principled decision.., is one that rests on reasons ... that in
their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate
result that is involved 30 To this Wechsler added, "when there is
conflict among values having constitutional protection, calling
for their ordering or their accommodation, I argue that the prin-
ciple of resolution must be neutral in a comparable sense (both
in the definition of the individual competing values and in the
approach that it entails to value competition)" 31 In adhering to
this liberal conception of values, both deontological and teleolog-
ical schools identify a principled right in respect of which the
State is neutral. According to that conception of rights, every in-
dividual has the freedom to enjoy the unfettered use of her
property32 Deontological theorists maintain that a right to pri-
vate property, in respect of which the State is neutral, is funda-
mental to moral development and human dignity.33 Teleological
theorists claim that it increases aggregate wealth.m The problem
is that both conceptions of private property threaten Native in-
terests, particularly where no individual in the affected Native
community has a right that is recognized by the Western Lib-
eral tradition.I For example, when a mining company wishes to
30. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUN.
DAMENTAL LAW 27 (1961). In evaluating Wechsler's "neutral reasoning," John Hart Ely
contends that "requirements of generality of principle and neutrality of application do
not provide a source of substantive content! JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISRUsT:
A THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REvIEw 54-55 (1980). On neutral reasoning generally, see Cass
Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law, 92 CoLux L. Rnv. 1 (1992); Harry T. Ed-
wards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991
WIs. L. REv. 837; Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561
(1988); Kent Greenewalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 982 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 29, at 47. But see Mark V.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Prin-
ciples, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
31. Wechsler, supra note 30, at xiv.
32. For an overview of property rights in the Western liberal tradition, see L.C.
BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (1977); ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND
POLITICAL THEORY (1986).
33. The philosophical foundations for this view of property come from LOCKE, supra
note 18, and G.W.F. Hegel, in PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1942). For a modern application, see
NOZICK, supra note 4. For an interesting reply to Nozick, see David Lyons, The New In-
dian Claims and Original Rights to Land, 4 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 249 (1977).
34. The philosophical foundations for this view of property come from JE.REMY BEN-
THAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION (1887); John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy,
in COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STuART MnLL (1963) and ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NA.
TIONS (1960).
35. See, ag., Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.
1959) (maintaining that the establishment clause in the First Amendment did not apply
to Native tribes); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 US. 49 (1978) (holding that the
Indian Civil Rights Act did not give rise to a cause of action for tribal members before
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mine land that is sacred as a burial site to a Native community,
the property interests that are accorded legal protection are
those of the property owner, the mining company. Should no in-
dividual Native Person have title to or easement over land, the
interests of that community are not recognized in law. The only
recourse available to the Native community is to show a legally
recognizable property right. Occasionally this can be done by
showing that it has a treaty or other right that is inconsistent
with the proposed use of land by the mining company. Absent
such a treaty right, the rights of the property owner trump the
interests of Native Peoples who are treated as non-owners who
lack a legal right to that property. Absent an individual Native
Person with title to or an easement over land, Native cultural
interests are subordinated to corporate property rights. A min-
ing company with a right to mine on a sacred burial site, is per
se entitled to do so. A Native band with an interest that is not
recognizable as a right has no legal recourse.
Part of the reason why the interests of Native communities
are not recognized is that modern Western liberals frame the
concept of liberty in terms of the equal liberty of all. Each indi-
vidual, supposedly, has the right to enjoy his liberty equally
with all other individuals. 36 Each, in turn, has a duty to respect
the liberty of all other individuals. Inherent within this concep-
tion of community, is the vision of a plurality of individuals, all
possessed of an equal right to liberty, who champion the liberty
of the whole.37 As John Rawls asserts, "all citizens are to have
an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of
the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which
they are to comply."38 Here, the liberal community encompasses
federal court). But see Morton v. Mancari, 417 US. 535, 554 (1974) (holding that hiring
preference for appointment to the Bureau of Indian Affairs is granted to Indians "not as
a discrete racial group, but rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.. :).
36. Will Kymlicka describes liberalism as "characterized both by a certain kind of
individualism-that is, individuals are viewed as the ultimate units of moral worth...
and by a certain kind of egalitarianism-that is, every individual has an equal moral
status, and hence is to be treated as an equal by the government, with equal concern
and respect. WILL KYMLcKA, LIBERALIsM, CommuNmr AND CULTURE 140 (1989) (citations
omitted).
37. To some extent liberals, like Ronald Dworkin, concern themselves with a "liberal
community." A "liberal community," in effect, consists of a community of habituated and
self-determining individuals. However, that community also embraces the solidarity that
individuals bring to one another through their mutual associations. See, eg., Ronald
Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1989). But see MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JusTIm: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); R. H. TAWNEY,
EQUALrY (4th ed. 1964).
38. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 221.
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no distinct cultural values or interests apart from the rights and
duties of each individual within it. Homogeneous in nature, the
equal liberty of all individuals transcends class, culture and re-
ligion.39 Rawls' liberal community accords no distinct treatment
to cultural and linguistic minorities. It passes over important so-
cial interests that are not explicated through individual rights
and duties.
At the same time, Rawls maintains that40 "many groups
[are] each equally entitled to engage in civil disobedience; 41 and
the "ideal solution" is to call "for a cooperative political alliance
of the minorities to regulate the overall level of dissent."42 But
ultimately, for Rawls, it is the infrastructure of individual rights
that renders civil society both vital and viable. 3
Rawls' brand of methodological individualism is signifi-
cantly mirrored in judicial practice. Judges treat liberty as a
right that inheres equally in every citizen under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause 4 and deny that liberty may differ in light of the
values and interests of discrete cultures that conceive of their
rights differently. They explain their action on the grounds that
courts are bound to preserve liberty indiscriminately;45 that they
are not to embroil themselves in the politics of race, empower-
ment and communal rights;4 and that to do otherwise would be
39. Id. at 231-33.
40. Id. at 224-29.
41. Id. at 374.
42. Id. Despite the centrality of individualized rights in Rawils' Theory of Justice, he
nevertheless envisages principles of self-determination that include "the right of a people
to settle its own affairs without the intervention of foreign powers." Id. at 378. However,
his principle is constrained by the liberty of the individual, subject only to the require-
ment that its exercise benefits the least advantaged in society. This is embodied in
Rawls' famous "second principle of justice". See id. at 73.
43. See id. at 201-51.
44. On the Equal Protection Clause as it applies to Indian Americans in particular,
see David C. Willims, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples,
38 UCLA L. Rav. 759 (1991). On the application of the Equal Protection Clause to cul-
tural minorities in general, see Steven Siegel, Race, Education and the Equal Protection
Clause in the 1990's, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 501 (1991). But see Christopher Steskal, Creating
Space for Racial Difference: The Case for African American Schools, 27 HARv. C.R-C.L. L.
RE,. 187 (1992) in which Steskal evaluates Garrett v. Board of Education of the Sch.
Dist. of the City of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
45. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). There, the
Court found that discrimination on the basis of wealth did. not violate the equal protec-
tion of the law. In particular, it validated financing education through local property
taxes, despite substantial disparities between districts in student expenditures.
46. See, eg., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456
A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). The court declared that the judiciary had no power to order the
construction of housing for low and moderate income persons. It stated further that
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to undermine their function within a constitutional democracy.47
Canadian courts adopt a comparable approach. They insist
that for courts to accord special status to some groups, such as
to the Native Women's Association of Canada,48 is to intrude
upon a legislative function within a constitutional democracy.
49
They also assume that cultural interests are protected only
when they consist of individual rights and only when all individ-
uals have the same rights.50 In their unqualified support for the
liberty of a plurality of individuals, these courts likely bypass
the interest of cultural communities to preserve distinct values
that distinguish them from the values adopted by other cul-
tures.51 For example, the fact that, long before recorded history,
courts could only strike down zoning schemes which, by their structure, denied the op-
portunity to construct such housing.
47. See, ag., Milliken v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717 (1974). But see Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 US. 528 (1985). On this substantive neutrality towards race,
see Substantive Equality, supra note 27. Rosenfeld remarked:
The principal function of fair equality of opportunity is to compensate for dis-
crepancies in social, economic, and educational advantages in order to improve
the prospects of those who would otherwise enjoy no more than a mere possi-
bility of success in the competition for desirable scarce goods. Moreover, fair
equality of opportunity may tend to neutralize all disparities in social condition
found in the relevant set of initial circumstances, rendering eventual inequali-
ties of result the exclusive product of differences in talent.
Id. at 1708 (footnotes omitted). See generally CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONsrUTIoNAL GOVERN-
mENT AND DEMORAcY (1950).
48. See Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627, 655-
56.
49. This exclusion of interests falling short of liberal rights is apparent in relation
to Native Peoples on the further ground that they are denied legal entitlements that dif-
fer from those of all other inhabitants. As Austin Abbott once observed, "the ultimate ob-
jective point to which all efforts for progress should be directed is to fix upon the Indian
the same personal, legal, and political status which is common to all other inhabitants."
Austin Abbott, Indians and the Law, 2 HARv. L. REv. 167, 174 (1888). But see JOAN WEI-
BEL-ORLANDO, INDIAN CoUNTRY, LA: M AINTAINING ETHIC ComM UNTy IN COMPLEX SOCIETY
(1991).
50. On this judicial reluctance, see Leon E. Trakman, The Demise of Positive Lib-
erty? Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada, 6(3) CONsT. F. 71 (1995).
51. This unwillingness to affirm communal, as distinct from individual, interests is
especially apparent in recent cases before the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with in-
equality of treatment on grounds of sexual orientation, gender and marriage. See Egan v.
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418; Thibaudeau v. Ca-
nada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627. On this trilogy of cases, see Leon E. Trakman, Section 15:
Equality? Where?, 6(4) CONST. F. 112 (1995). But see Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995,
at 1035-41. On this tradition of excluding community interests from democratic values
in the history of American thought, see MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE
AGE OF ENTERPRISE, 1865-1910 (1951). Kymlicka notes that the unwillingness of liberals
to affirm communal interests is seen by many commentators as the greatest impediment
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a Native community valued the bark of a particular tree to con-
struct canoes and passed down this interest in canoe-making
over generations so that it became an integral part of that com-
munity's identity, means nothing in a Western liberal tradition
in which a lumber company invokes its property rights to clear-
cut those trees. In stressing the individual, here corporate, right
to be free from State intrusion, Western liberalism does not
reckon with the rights and interests of distinct communities,
their cultural otherness, apart from the liberal rights of the in-
dividual. To accord a right to a Native community to continue
making canoes with this bark would be, illegitimately, to treat
as a right a cultural interest that does not qualify as an individ-
ual right within a liberal plurality. In insisting that the cultural
interests of Native Peoples are less than individual rights, mod-
ern liberals exclude those interests that Native Peoples often
hold dear. They fail to acknowledge, too, the importance of those
cultural interests to the development of a more vital relation-
ship between rights and responsibilities. 2
The imperviousness of liberal rights-talk towards the iden-
tity of Native Peoples is most troubling when mainstream law-
makers assume that only Western liberal rights are worthy of
consideration, while Native values, in varying from those rights,
are treated as non-rights.53 For example,
[The Nishga Native peoples] were at the time of settlement a very primi-
tive people with few of the institutions of civilized society... I have no
evidence to justify a conclusion that the aboriginal rights claimed by the
successors of these primitive peoples are of a kind that it should be as-
sumed the Crown recognized them when it acquired the mainland of
British Columbia.-
to a satisfactory resolution of Native issues. Kymlicka, however, believes group rights
can be accommodated within liberalism. See KYMLcKA, supra note 36, at 144.
52. On the importance of Native culture to the development of a conception of com-
munity rights, see Michael McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on
Liberal Individualism, 4(2) CAN. J. L. AND JURISPRUDENCE, 217 (1991); VERNON VAN DYKE,
HUMAN RIGHTs. ETHNICITY, AND DIscRIMnmATioN (1985); Darlene M. Johnston, Native
Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of Group Self-Preservation, 2 CAN. J. L. & Julus.
PRUDENCE, 19 (1989); Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of
Groups, 56 S. CAL. L Rv. 1001 (1983); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE InITS OF
JusncE (1982).
53. See, e.g., Richard W. Perry, The Logic of the Modern Nation-State and the Legal
Construction of Native American Tribal Identity, 28 IND. L. R1v. 547 (1995); R. A- WI-
SAss, THE AMERICAN INDiAN iN WEsTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990); Brian Slattery, Aborigi-
nal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims, 29 OsGooDE HALL U. 681 (1991).
54. Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Davey, J.). See also Michael
Asch & Patrick Macklem, Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R.
v. Sparrow (1991), 29 ALTA. L. REv. 498 (1991). But see W.I.C. Binnie, The Sparrow Doc-
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The result of this mainstream approach toward liberty is three
seemingly uncompromising assertions: (1) that rights are ex-
tolled wholly through an adverse relationship between individ-
ual and State; (2) that all other conceptions of justice are ex-
cluded from, or at least subordinated to, that adverse
relationship; and (3) that the negative rights of the individual
trump all other values and interests, including those of Native
communities.55 The effect is that Native conceptions .of justice
are relegated to primitive curiosities.56 Marginalized by legisla-
tion, administrative regulation and judge made law, they be-
come subservient to a Western legal system that treats Native
interests in land as primeval, or simply, unpalatable. 57 The re-
sult is an Indian Civil Rights Act5 8 in the United States and an
Indian Act 59 in Canada that subjugate traditional Native life,60
Departments of Indian Affairs that ignore Native values61 and
trine: Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning?, 15 QUEEN'S L.J. 217 (1990).
55. A communitarian compromise within liberalism between individual rights and
collective interests is to advocate a two-order conception of rights: individual rights serve
as first order rights, while communal rights operate at the second order, subordinated to
the first. See, eg., Charles Taylor, Can Canada Survive the Charter, 30 ALTA. L. REv.
427, 438-47 (1992). See also Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in CHARLES TAY-
LOR, MULTICULTURASM AND 'THE PoLriCs OF RECOGNION": AN ESSAY 61 (Amy Gutman
ed., 1992). The problem in Taylor's analysis is that the first order rights, liberal in na-
ture, unavoidably trump the second order of collective rights and the status quo is
perpetuated.
56. This intolerance towards Native Peoples is well chronicled in the American case
law. See, ag., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 US. (6 Cran.) 87 (1810); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Saint Catherine's Lumber and Milling Co. v. The Queen, [1888]
14 A.C. 46 (P.C.). See also Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States,
and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 671 (1989). But see Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 US. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
57. For an excellent depiction of racism endured by Native Peoples in Canada, see
Patricia Monture, Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah, 2 C.J.W.L. 159 (1986). See
also Freeman, supra note 24.
58. 25 US.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
59. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5, s.1 (1994) (Can.).
60. On US. law governing the rights and responsibilities of American Indians, see,
e.g., David L. Burnett, Jr. An Historical Analysis of the 1968 "Indian Civil Rights" Act, 9
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557 (1972); NORTH AMERIcAN INDIAN READER (1973); FELiX S. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122-23 (1945). See also The Indian Act, Canada, Bill
C-31, June, 1985; Leslie Francis Stokes Upton, The Origins of Canadian Indian Policy,
8(4) J. CAN. STuD. 51 (1973); KAHN-TINETA MILLER & ROBERT G. MOORE, THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN AcT 108 (1978).
61. On the forced assimilation of Native American values within the mainstream,
see Michael P. Gross, Indian Control for Quality Indian Education, 49 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 237, 244 (1973). Gross observes:
Where blacks have been forcibly excluded (segregated) from white society by
law, ndians-aboriginal peoples with their own cultures, languages, religions
and territories-have been forcibly included (integrated) into that society by
205
206 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
judiciaries that treat Native interests as inconsequential in
law.62 Illustrating the primacy of Western liberal values, Title 1
of the American Indian Civil Rights Act63 stipulates:
No Indian tribe... in exercising powers of self-government shall... (1)
make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the peo-
ple peaceably to assemble... (5) take any private property for a public
use without just compensation... (8) deny to any person accused of an
offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by
jury of not less than six persons.64
law. That is what ... [is] meant by coercive assimilation-the practice of com-
pelling, through submersion, an ethnic, cultural and linguistic minority to shed
its uniqueness and identity and mingle with the rest of society.
Id. at 244. This assimilation of Natives or Native Peoples and the marginalization of
their historical culture evolves into a self-fulfilling system. As Harper once remarked: "It
may be stated as a first principle that it is the policy of the Department [of Indian Af-
fairs, Canada] to provide gratuitous assistance to those Indians who can provide for
themselves." See also Duane Champagne, Beyond Assimilation as a Strategy for National
Integration: The Persistence of American Indian Political Identities, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CoNTEArP. PRos. 109 (1993); Nancy 0. Lurie, The Contemporary American Indian Scene,
in NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS IN HISTORICAL PERsPEcTivE 418, 456 (Eleanor B. Leacock &
Nancy 0. Lurie eds., 1971) ("there is no question that termination and related legislation
[in the 1950's] were strongly endorsed by well-meaning legislators who were influenced
by analogies to the Negro movement for civil rights"). On American policy towards Na-
tive peoples, see David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians
as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REv. 759 (1991); Nell J. Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its
Sources, Scope and Limitations 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984); S. LntAN TyER, A HIs-
TORY OF INDIAN POLCY (1973).
62. This marginalization of Indian rights is most apparent in courts justifying the
extraction of taxes from Native Peoples. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw
Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 US.
114 (1993); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Thlopthlocco Tribal Town of Oklahoma, 839 P.2d
180 (Okla. 1992); Oklahoma Tax Comn'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 498 US. 505 (1991); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Res-
ervation, 447 US. 134 (1980); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reser-
vation v. Moe, 425 US. 463 (1976). See also ANGIE DEBo, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF
THE UNITED STATES (1989) (outlining the confiscation of Native lands in Oklahoma
"whether by persuasion, intimidation, or fraud, but in the background was the authority
to put the policy into effect without their [Indian peoples'] consent Id. at 305). See gen-
erally Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest Tri-
bal Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1281 (1995); Gloria Valencia-Weber, American Indian
* Law and History: Instructional Mirrors, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251 (1994); ANGIE DEBO, AND
STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FrvE CIVILIZED TRIBES (1972); ANGIE DEBO,
THE ROAD TO DISAPPEARANCE: A HISTORY OF THE CREEK INDIANS (1941).
63. 25 US.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
64. 25 U.S.C. § 1302. See also JANET A. McDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE
AMERicAN INDIAN 1887-1934 (1991); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism:
The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Tradi-
tions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 237, 271-75 (1989); Richard A. Monette, A
New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and
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The subordination of Native values within a Western liberal
system is even more explicitly depicted, historically, in the re-
marks of a Deputy Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs,
Canada: "[O]ur object [the Department of Indian Affairs] is to
continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has
not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no question,
and no Indian Department."65 Similarly, judges have invoked
Western liberal conceptions of sovereignty and title to restrict
Native land claims on grounds that those claims are interests
that fall short of legal rights.66 The views of Chief Justice Mar-
shall of the United States Supreme Court, over 150 years ago,
remain starkly troubling today: "But the tribes of Indians inhab-
iting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was
war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.
To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the
country a wilderness...."6 7 A more tempered, but still compara-
ble attitude is evidenced in the more recent Canadian case of
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, known as the "Gitksan"
case.68 In this case, a British Columbia Court denied the Gitk-
Tribes in Light of Our Federation and Republican Democracy, 25 U. ToL L. REv. 617
(1994); CHARLES WILKINSON, AmERICAN INDIANS. TIME AND THE LAw 113-14 (1987);
NICHOLAS C. PEROFF, MENOMINEE DRUMS: TRIBAL TERMINATION AND RESTORATION 1954-
1974 (1982); Burnett, supra note 60.
65. J. RICK PONTING & ROGER GmBINS, OUT OF IRRELEVANCE: A SOCMo-PoLircAL IN-
TRODUCTION TO INDIAN AFFAIRS IN CANADA 3-30 (1980). See also the Trudeau government's
1969 White Paper on Indian Policy, A Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian
Policy in RICHARD P. BOWLES ET AL, THE INDIAN- ASSIMILATION, INTEGRATION OR SEPARA-
TION? (1972). The purpose of the policy was to remove all legal and constitutional refer-
ences to Natives (including a dismantling of the reservation system) so that Natives
could be "equal" participants in the cultural, social, economic and political life of Ca-
nada. Id.; SALLY M. WEAVER, MAKING CANADIAN INDIAN POLICY- THE HIDDEN AGENDA
1968-1970 (1981). On the ongoing nature and effect of this policy towards Native Peoples
in more recent times, see KYMLICKA, supra note 36, at 142-44.
66. This is also apparent in the insistence of courts that State rights outweigh Na-
tive interests for the purpose of State tax. See, ag., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mex-
ico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 US.
134 (1980). See generally Karl J.Kramer, The Most Dangerous Branch: An Institutional
Approach to Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in American Indian Jurisdictional
Determinations, 1986 Wis. L REV. 989 (judicial balancing of federal and non-tribal mem-
ber interests has precluded the Supreme Court from examining or giving weight to tri-
bal interests in resolving jurisdictional issues). Compare with the Canadian Supreme
Court decision in R. v. Derricksan, [1976] 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159.
67. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 590.
68. [1991] 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.). In Delgamuukw, the chiefs of the Gitksan
and Wet'suwet'en Indians in the Province of British Columbia sought a declaration that
they were sovereign and self-governing communities both historically and within the
framework of Canadian federalism. The claim was dismissed by the Chief Justice of
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san and Wet'suwet'en Peoples title to disputed land on grounds
that they lacked an identifiable, civilized and ultimately, cogni-
zable title. "It cannot be said that they [the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en] owned and governed such vast and almost inac-
cessible tracts of land in any sense that would be recognized by
the law. In no sense could it be said that the Gitksan or
Wet'suwet'en law or title followed these people...69
Invoking a Western law of nations, that Court maintained
that a liberal regime of rights subordinated Native land claims
to a European sovereign. "[I]t is part of the law of nations,
which has become part of the common law, that discovery and
occupation of the lands of this continent by European nations,
or occupation and settlement, gave rise to a right of [European]
sovereignty."70 Declining to protect the distinct cultural value
which the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Peoples have in the preser-
vation of land, the Delgamuukw Court reduced their interest to
a non-right, lacking in legal cognizance. 71 Central to this judicial
position was the Court's conviction that ownership is the embod-
iment of Western liberal rights that apply regardless of their
content, the nature of their enjoyment, or their impact upon
others, notably, Native Peoples. 72 However widespread might
have been the original interest of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
Peoples in land, the Delgamuukw Court marginalized that inter-
est in favor of a Western liberal conception of ownership.7 3
British Columbia, Allan McEachern on the basis that "aboriginal customs, to the extent
that could be described as laws before the creation of the colony became customs which
depended upon the willingness of the community to live and abide by them, but they
ceased to have any force, as laws, within the colony." Delgamuukw, 79 D.L.R. (4th) at
453. For further commentary on this case, see Bruce Ryder, Aboriginal Rights and Del-
gamuukw v. The Queen (British Columbia), 5 CONST. F. 43-48 (1994); DON MONET &
SKAWu'U (ARDYTHE WILSON), COLONIALISM ON TRIAL: INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS AND THE
GrrKsAN AND WE:VSUWETEN SovErEIGNTY CASE (1992).
69. Delgamuukw, 79 D.L.R. (4th) at 451-52 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 284.
71. This plight of Native Peoples is accentuated in the denial that they are entitled
to any new title under the Canadian Charter. "[Tihe [Canadian] Charter does not pur-
port to confer new freedoms," Re Cromer, 29 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 659 (B.C.CA, Lambert,
J.). On Native conceptions of title, see Leroy Little Bear, A Concept of Native Title, 5
CAN. LEGAL Am BULL. 99 (1982); Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66
CAN. B. REv. 727 (1987); Menno Boldt & Anthony Long, Tribal Philosophies and the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 7 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUDIES 478 (1984). See also
Noel Lyon, An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation, 26 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 95 (1988).
72. On the "neutrality" of courts towards the substance of law, see supra notes 29-
30.
73. For a comparable line of reasoning to the Delgamuukw case, see Sawridge Band
v. Canada, [1993] 109 D.L.R. (4th) 364 (Muldoon, J.). Arguably, there is support in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for subjecting rights to responsibilities in re-
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The result of this liberal conception of rights is the displace-
ment of Native stewardship over land in favor of individual
ownership,74 a disruption in cultural, linguistic and family val-
ues among Native Peoples, 75 a breakdown in relations between
Native communities, 76 and ultimately, a threat to a distinct Na-
tive way of life.77
Not all Western courts apply liberal conceptions of rights so
stringently.78 Some judges recognize that the original title of Na-
tive Peoples are interests that warrant legal recognition. They
also constrain liberal conceptions of title grounded in colonial oc-
cupation that are exercised at the expense of such interests. For
example, in the famous case of Mabo v. Queensland,79 the Aus-
tralian High Court held that title based on the traditional laws
and customs of Native and Torres Strait Islander Peoples had
not been extinguished by valid acts of Imperial, Colonial, State,
Territory, or Commonwealth Government.80 The Mabo Court
spect of interests that are detrimentally affected by the exercise of those rights. One key
purpose underlying the Charter is "securing for individuals the full benefit of the Char-
ter's protection." R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 481, 524 (S.C.C. Dickson, C.J.).
The other is not "overshoot[ing] the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question".
Id. It is in this second purpose that the responsibilities that inhere in rights are
grounded.
74. See, ag., ANN FmIuP-RMoRDAN, WHEN OUR BAD SEASON CoMEs: A CULTURAL AC-
COUNT OF SUBSISTENCE HARVESTING AND HARVEST DISRUPTION ON THE YUKON DELTA 312
(Alaska Anthropological Ass'n Monograph Series No. 1, 1986).
75. Id. at 325-26.
76. Id. at 311-12.
77. Id. at 309-12. See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning to Live Within
Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence' Learning to Live With the Plenary
Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 AIz. L. REv. 439 (1988); Neil Jessup
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L
REv. 195 (1984); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 Am. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 1; Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protec-
tion of Indian Autonomy and Self Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979 (1981); Christopher
L. Dyer, Tradition Loss as Secondary Disaster: Long-Term Cultural Impacts of the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill, 13 Soc. SPECTRUM 65, 75 (1993).
78. Nor is Western liberalism wholly impervious to the interests of Native Peoples.
See, ag., Fred Coyote, Land Holds Families Together, in I W.L Dm AN INDIAN 15 (1980);
See also DAvID I. GETcHEs Er A , FEDERAL INDAN LAW. CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (3d ed.
1993). But see Williams, Jr., supra note 77, at 447; RUSSEL L. BARSH & JAMES Y. HENDER-
SON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND PoLrnCAL LBERTY (1980).
79. Mabo v. Queensland (No.2), [1992] 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.). See also Mabo v. Queen-
sland, [1989] 166 C.L.R. 186 (Austl.).
80. Mabo, [1992] 175 C.L.R. 1. Interestingly, the conception of land as the common
possession of humankind, as distinct from a purely private possession, is implicit in the
Western Legal Tradition, notably in Western conceptions of international law. See, eg.,
CmusriA WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 141-43 (Joseph Drake trans.,
1964).
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also acknowledged limitations within a terra nullius doctrine,
according to which land belonged to no one prior to European
settlement: "A common law doctrine [terra nullius] founded on
unjust discrimination in the enjoyment of civil and political
rights demands reconsideration."8 1
Some courts also recognize that, notwithstanding liberal
theory, the State has a fiduciary responsibility 2 to protect the
interests of Native Peoples. As the Supreme Court of Canada
stated in R. v. Sparrow,S "the Government has the responsibil-
ity to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peo-
ples" 4 This approach, still rudimentary in nature, places a fidu-
ciary duty of utmost good faith upon the State to ensure that
liberal rights are not exercised in disregard of Native interests.
However paternalistic the legal protection accorded Native
interests, it is apparent that Native Peoples had a valid fiduci-
ary claim. They were the first nations to occupy this Continent;
they possess distinct languages, traditions and cultures, and to
deny their distinctiveness would be to undermine Western lib-
eral values themselves. As the Federal and Provincial govern-
ments of Canada acknowledged in 1992, "[t]he Aboriginal peo-
ples of Canada, being the first peoples to govern this land, have
the right to promote their languages, cultures and traditions
and to ensure the integrity of their societies, and their govern-
ments constitute one of the three orders of government of Ca-
nada."85 This responsibility to protect Native interests, as dis-
81. Mabo v. Queensland, [1992] 66 A.L.R. 422, 498. For a general analysis of the
Mabo case, see COmmONwEALTH OF AusTRALIA, MABo, THE HIGH COURT DECISION ON NA.
TIVE TITLE, A DISCUSSION PAPER (1993); MABo: A JUDICIAL REVOLUTION: THE ABORIGINAL
LAND RIGHTS DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON AUSTRALIAN LAW (MA. Stephenson & Suri
Ratnapala eds., Univ. of Queensland Press 1993).
82. The more usual legal terminology is "fiduciary duty," but the relationship is bet-
ter thought of as a responsibility. To be a fiduciary is to be in a relationship of trust
whereby the trustee holds title for the benefit of another, the beneficiary. The equitable
notion of a fiduciary relationship developed precisely because the beneficiary had no
right recognized by the common law. Historically, the courts of equity began to recognize
that the beneficiary had an interest worthy of protection and imposed a responsibility
upon the fiduciary to recognize this. But, technically speaking, the beneficiary is still
said to have an "equitable," but not a "legal" right. Even today this distinction between
equitable and legal rights is made; however, the equitable rights of the beneficiary are
better thought of as the responsibilities that inhere within the fiduciary's rights.
83. [1973] S.C.R. 313. See also RENEE DUPUIS & KENT MCNEIL, CANADA'S FwUCIARY
OBLIGATION TO ABORIGINAL PEOPLES IN THE CoNTExT OF ACCESSION TO SOVEREIGNTY BY
QUEBEC (1995). Dupuis and McNeil note specifically that, "the Government of Canada
has constitutional responsibility for Aboriginal people and cannot renounce that respon-
sibility unilaterally" Id. at 67-68.
84. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.R. at 1108.
85. CONSENSUS REPORT ON THE CONSTIUTION, Part I(a), § 2(B) (1992). The Charlot-
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tinct from liberal rights, is also apparent in two related
demands before the American system of justice: "[r]eturn the
right of decision to the tribes-restore their power to hold the
dominant society at arm's length" 86
This legal recognition accorded Native interests justifies,
not the displacement of Western liberal rights, but the incorpo-
ration of different systems of value within them. This is accom-
plished by recognizing that Native Peoples, like the Gitskan and
Wet'suwet'en, have developed alternative conceptions of rights
which the liberal rights regime has failed adequately to protect.
That protection arises only when liberal institutions, not limited
to courts of law, defend the cultural values of distinct Peoples
whose interests, traditionally, have been denied legal
safeguards. 8 7
The virtue of accommodating Native interests, alongside
Western liberal values, is apparent in the willingness of some
tetown Agreement elaborated:
The Constitution should be amended to recognize that the Aboriginal peoples
of Canada have the inherent right of self-government within Canada... [This]
right... should be interpreted in light of the recognition of Aboriginal govern-
ments as one of three orders of government in Canada .. .The exercise of
[this] right... includes the authority of the duly constituted legislative bodies
of Aboriginal peoples . . . (a) to safeguard and develop their languages, cul-
tures, economies, identities, institutions and traditions; and (b) to develop,
maintain and strengthen their relationship with their lands, waters and envi-
ronment.. .
Id. at Part IV, § 41. The Charter defines the "aboriginal peoples of Canada" as "Indian,
Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada." CAN. CONSr. (Constitution Act, 1982), Pt. I (Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 35(2). See generally M. E. Turpel, The Chariot-
tetown Discord and Aboriginal Peoples, in THE CHARLOTEToWN AccoRD, THE REFEREN-
DUM AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA 117 (1993).
86. D'ARcy McNicI,=. THEY CAME HERE FIRST. THE EPIc OF THE AmmCAN INDIAN
285 (rev. ed. 1975). See also Rachel San Kranowitz et al., Comment, Toward Consent
and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R-C.L.
L. REv. 507, 586, 601-02 (1987). But see Russel L. Barsh, Indigenous North American
and Contemporary International Law, 62 O. L. Rav. 73 (1983); Robert N. Clinton, Re-
dressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARm
L. REv. 77 (1993); Erik M. Jensen, American Indian Tribes and Secession, 29 TUlSA L.J.
385 (1993).
87. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms expressly provides that "the
guarantee... of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or
derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that-pertain to the ab-
original peoples of Canada. . " CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), Part I (Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 25. Section 27 of that Charter provides further that:
'Ihis Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and en-
hancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada" Id. at § 27. See also Brian Slattery,
First Nations and the Constitution: A Quest of Trust, 17 CAN. B. Rv. 261 (1992); Thomas
Isaac, The Storm Over Aboriginal Self-Government, 2 CAN. NATIVE L. REP. 6 (1992).
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judges to accord legal status to Native interests in land. For ex-
ample, in R. v. Sparrow,88 the Supreme Court of Canada has ex-
tended legal protection to Native interests in the salmon fishery.
It has asserted that: "the salmon fishery has always constituted
an integral part of the... distinctive culture [of the Musqueam
Peoples]... The Musqueam have always fished for reasons con-
nected to their culture and physical survival."89 This legal recog-
nition also arises in international law where provision is made
for the right of indigenous peoples to preserve a distinct way of
life, along with a freedom from State intrusion.90
In summary, Western liberalism often has failed to grant le-
gal recognition to the interests of Native communities on
grounds that these interests are not embodied in liberal rights.
Despite recent and sporadic gestures to the contrary, most
judges have perpetuated the liberal infrastructure of rights, rel-
egating cultural interests of Native Peoples in land to non-
rights. An alternative is to expand upon the fiduciary responsi-
bilities that arise from the exercise of liberal rights. This in-
volves, among other actions, modifying liberal values to encom-
pass the cultural interests of Native Peoples. It also means
recognizing that rights are subject to continuing responsibilities,
including the responsibility of the State, cultural communities
and individuals alike to accord legal recognition to Native inter-
ests that are not dubbed liberal rights.
III. RECOGNIZING LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
Liberal theory grounds rights in reciprocal legal relations.
Each individual has rights and each is equally entitled to have
88. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
89. Id. at 1099. This case, R. v. Sparrow, is especially significant in jettisoning a
line of cases that extinguished Native rights as a matter of State sovereignty. See, eg.,
R. v. Derricksan, [1976] 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159 (S.C.C.). See generally Michael Asch & Pat-
rick Macklem, Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow,
29 ALTA. L. REv. 498 (1991). On legal debate in the United States between commercial
and Native interests in fish stocks, including salmon, see Dana Johnson, Native Ameri-
can Treaty Rights to Scarce Natural Resources, 43 UCLA L. REv. 547 (1995); Mason D.
Morisset, The Legal Standards for Allocating the Fisheries Resource, 22 IDAHO L. REV.
609 (1986).
90. See S. J. Anaya, Canada's Fiduciary Obligation Towards Indigenous Peoples in
Quebec under International Law in General, in CANADA'S FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION TO AB.
ORIGINAL PEOPLES IN THE CONTEXT OF ACCESSION TO SovEREIGmNY BY QUEBEC 40 (Min. of
Supply & Services, Ottawa, 1995). See also SOVEREIGN INJUSTICE, FORCIBLE INCLUSION OF
THE JAMES BAY CREES AND CREE TERRITORY INTO A SOVEREIGN QUEBEC (Grand Council of
the Crees, 1995); Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A
Review of International Instruments, 38 IN'rL & COMaP. L. Q. 867 (1989).
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those rights protected in law. That protection arises through
each individual's duty to every other individual not to infract
upon the rights of that other; and the State owes a comparable
duty to all individuals equally. Relations between individual
right-holders are reciprocal: no individual is entitled to exercise
his rights so as to deny the rights of any other individual. Rela-
tions between the State and each individual are reciprocal too:
the State has a duty to respect the rights of each individual and
each individual has a duty to respect the laws (and rights) of
the State.
In liberal theory, rights are also self-operating: once they
have been found to exist, the manner in which they are exer-
cised is within the discretion of those who have them. This dis-
cretion is conditional only upon limits which the State imposes
to protect the rights of others or which those others assert in
protecting themselves.
Finally, the lawful exercise of an individual right in liberal
theory is not conditional upon the satisfaction of interests that
do not constitute countervailing rights (and powers): alterna-
tively phrased, rights are legally enforceable regardless of their
impact upon the interests of another or others that do not them-
selves constitute rights (and powers).
This liberal conception of rights fails to reckon with Native
cultural interests in several respects. First, in conceiving of
rights as being conditional only upon countervailing rights (and
powers), Native interests that diverge from rights are excluded.
Second, in insisting that rights are exercised at the discretion of
right-holders, rights produce uncertain consequences for Native
Peoples. In particular, right-holders need not pay heed to Native
interests: as a result, whether and to what extent a right-holder
chooses to reckon with Native interests is entirely within the
discretion of that right-holder. Third, in exercising these choices
at their discretion, right-holders have no duty to consult with
Native Peoples: in effect they are not required to determine the
nature of Native interests, nor the impact of the exercise of
rights upon them, nor the manner in which liberal rights might
be exercised differently to redress that impact.
These liberal preconditions to the exercise of rights create a
distinct dilemma for Native Peoples. Where the interests of Na-
tive Peoples do not constitute rights, Native Peoples do not ac-
quire any reciprocal protection that is provided by rights. In
supporting rights as distinct from interests, the State also does
not accord legal protection to Native interests. As a result, Na-
tive Peoples are denied the legal support of the State on the ba-
sis of the exercise of property rights that has an unequal impact
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upon them. As in decades past, Native Peoples are left without
a legal remedy, other than political action and civil
disobedience.
One response to this dilemma of Native Peoples is to ex-
pand upon legal relations to better encompass Native interests.
A restricted option is to reconstitute Native interests to fall
within existing categories of legal relations, as when Native in-
terests themselves are constituted as rights. An expanded option
is to develop new categories of legal relations to justify the pro-
tection of those interests.
Illustrating the restricted option is the work of Wesley
Hohfeld.9 Exemplifying the expanded option is the succeeding
section of this article. The intention, here, is to discuss Hohfeld's
construction of rights specifically in relation to Native Peoples
and thereafter, to reconstitute those relations to better accom-
modate the interests of those Peoples. This will involve reckon-
ing with legal categories beyond the reciprocal protection ac-
corded by rights to right-holders. It will also mean attributing
different qualities to these expanded legal relations, including
different conditions to govern their exercise.
A. Hohfeld's Relationships
Wesley Hohfeld, writing eighty years ago, conceived of lib-
eral rights as an expanded set of basic legal relations.92 He did
not question the liberal foundation of rights, but simply ex-
pounded upon them so as to include claims, privileges, powers
and immunities. He also expanded upon liberal legal relations,
by encompassing opposite and correlative relationships. In ex-
tending liberal rights to privileges, powers and immunities and
in incorporating them into extended legal relations, he provided
a rudimentary way in which to adapt liberal rights to the values
and interests of Native Peoples. 93 Hohfeld's basic legal relations
91. On Hohfeld's approach, see infra Part HA
92. See, e.g., Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 9, at 710. On
Hohfeld's schema of rights in general, see Hohfeld, Rights and Jural Relations, supra
note 9.
93. On the capacity to invoke Hohfeld's analysis to adapt liberal rights to Native in-
terests, see infra Parts m-IV. Hohfeld's schema is useful in specifying that duties are
owed to rightholders. However, his schema is deficient in not imposing responsibilities
upon rightholders. This deficiency is most pronounced when individuals have interests
that fall short of rights and therefore are not the subject of duties. This deficiency is
most serious in relation to Native Persons whose interests are not ordinarily accorded
the status of rights within liberal discourse. On the marginalization of Native interests
in liberal thought, notably before courts of law, see supra Part I.
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are expressed in the following tabular form.94
Basic Legal Relation Opposite/Contradictory Correlative
Right No - Right Duty
A's claim against B A's lack of claim B's obligation to
against B respect A's claim
Privilege Duty No-right
A's freedom from claim A's obligation to B's lack of claim
of B respect claim by B against A
Power Disability Liability
A's affirmative control A's lack of control over B's subjection to As
over a legal relation a legal relation control over a legal
with B. with B relation
Immunity Liability Disability
A's freedom from B's A's subjection to B's B's lack of control over
power. control over a legal a legal relation
relation with A.
According to Hohfeld, the rights, privileges, powers and im-
munities of each individual are balanced against the rights,
privileges, powers and immunities of everyone else. In effect, A
has a right which B has the duty to respect, or a privilege in re-
spect of which B lacks a claim against A. A also has a corre-
sponding duty to respect B's rights, such as B's rights to per-
sonal security. In addition, A has no claim in respect of B's
privileges. A and B's powers and immunities are represented
similarly. A has a power in respect of which B has a disability,
or an immunity in respect of which B has a liability. A has a
corresponding liability in respect of B's power and a disability in
respect of B's immunity.
So conceived, Hohfeld evaluates rights in relation to those
who exercise or are subject to them. Illustrating a legal relation-
ship between a right and a duty, a mining company has a right
to use its property as it wishes; a Native Person has a duty to
respect that right and may not interfere with its exercise. The
restriction upon the mining company's right to use that property
arises either by virtue of a statute or regulation, or on account
of the rights of others, including Native Persons. By imposing
duties upon that mining company, its rights are limited exter-
nally in accordance with the rights of others, including possibly,
those of Native Peoples.95
The nature of basic legal relations is readily illustrated by
analyzing the legal relationship between individuals within Na-
94. See Hohfeld, Rights and Jural Relations, supra note 9.
95. On responsibilities that limit rights internally, see infra Part HI.
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rive and Non-Native communities in two situations. In situation
1, a Native Person has a right which a Non-Native Person has a
duty to respect and the State has a duty not to infringe. For ex-
ample, a Native Person may have a right to hunt and fish on re-
serve land; a Non-Native Person and the State may have a duty
to respect that right, specifically by not interfering with its exer-
cise. The second situation is the converse of the first. A Native
Person has a duty to respect the right of a Non-Native Person,
while the State has a duty not to infringe that right.96 A mining
company may have a property right to mine and Native Persons
and the State may have a duty to respect that right by not in-
terfering with it. These two situations are depicted in the table
below.97
A quasi- Hohfeldian view of the Inter-Party Dimension
status quo
Native Person's (A) Non-Native Person's
Legal Relations (B) Legal Relations
Situation 1 Native Person (A) has A has a right B has a duty to
a right against B or State. respect the right of
A.
Situation 2 Non-Native Person (B) A has a duty to B has a right against
has a right respect the right of A or State.
By recognizing privileges, powers and immunities, not only
rights, Hohfeld's basic legal relations can accommodate more ex-
tensive legal relations than those which ordinarily arise in lib-
eral rights-talk. For example, Hohfeld's jural relations are capa-
ble of accommodating recent claims by Native Peoples that
commercial land be transferred to them in light of their histori-
cal title and status as self-determining Peoples. These claims ap-
propriately are conceived as privileges founded upon historical
title, not simply as rights.98 They are also fittingly viewed as im-
munities from intrusive State action, such as expropriation. In
this respect, Hohfeld's analysis can advance Native claims
within an existing legal vocabulary: this factor demonstrates the
96. Hohfeld does not contemplate a State within his conception of legal relations.
However, conceiving of a State, with rights and duties, is consistent with his analysis of
jural relations. See supra note 92.
97. This table extrapolates from Hohfeld's analysis. It does not exhaust the analyti-
cal possibilities that likely arise from his conception of legal relations. It also does not
treat Native rights as privileges, as Hohfeld likely would have done in relation to Native
claims to self-determination and to land.
98. See, eg., Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 1.
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value of Hohfeld's work in helping to accord legal protection to
the interests of Native Peoples.99
B. Limitations in Hohfeld's Relationships
Despite its virtue in identifying an expanded set of legal re-
lations, Hohfeld's schema still only describes legal relations as
they are: it does not comment upon their social, economic and
political value.10 Nor does his analysis take account of cultural
values and interests that fall outside of those relations. In pre-
serving the exclusivity of a right/duty relationship, Hohfeld's
analysis does not accord legal status to interests that vary from
liberal rights, unless those interests are the subject of duties ex-
ternal to those rights. Once a right is found to exist, everyone-
including Native Persons-has a duty to respect it. No corre-
sponding protection is accorded Native interests that are unpro-
tected in law because they are construed as being less than
rights, privileges, powers and immunities. 1 1 For example, ac-
cording to his analysis, Native interests in hunting and fishing
would not be the subject of legal relations because they do not
constitute legal rights, privileges, powers or immunities. In con-
trast, Hohfeld's analysis would protect the right of a corporation
to strip-mine on land occupied by Native Peoples when that
right forms part of a legal relationship involving rights, power,
privileges, or immunities. His analysis would also impose a duty
upon Native Peoples to respect those mining rights, at the ex-
pense of their traditions, when Native interests fall short of lib-
eral rights. The result under a Hohfeldian analysis that reaf-
firms liberal Values would be inequitable. Strip mining
companies, in freely exercising their mining rights, would lack a
corresponding duty not to intrude upon the interests of Native
Peoples in the land. The harm to Native Peoples would be the
99. In the interests of simplicity, all Native claims will be treated as rights claims.
However, rights will be conceived of more expansively than Hohfeld's conception of
rights. In particular, they will be viewed as encompassing responsibilities. See infra Part
II.
100. In this respect Hohfeld's analysis does not respond to objections directed at a
priori conceptions of liberty. See supra Part L
101. The fact that the interests of Native Peoples are not protected in Hohfeld's
schema is complicated by the further liberal assumption that everyone has comparable
rights. See supra Part L This ignores the different manner in which rights come into be-
ing, as well as imbalances in the nature and function of correlatives and opposites in re-
lation to those rights. See generally GERHARD N. LENSeY, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A THEORY
oF SocLL STRATIFICATION (1966).
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depletion of their traditional hunting and fishing grounds, 102
their continued commercial exploitation and the lack of harmony
in relations affecting them.10 3
IV. TRANSFORMING LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just one and
consequently at the time when we acknowledge the end of a sort of cul-
tural monopoly, be it illusory or real, we are threatened with the de-
struction of our own discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that there
are just others, that we ourselves are an "other" among others.'
Hohfeld's neutrality towards the content of rights is not a
defect in his analysis. After all, his aim was not to reconstitute
liberal rights, only to expound upon their nature and content.
The value of Hohfeld's work lies in identifying an expanded set
of legal relationships involving rights. However, in declining to
recognize that responsibilities inhere in rights, his analysis fails
to respond to fundamental deficiencies in the liberal structuring
of rights. Extending legal relations beyond Hohfeld's analysis to
encompass responsibilities, as is proposed in this article, does
not itself eradicate the threat of marginalizing Native culture.
But accepting responsibilities as an inherent part of rights does
take account of cultural interests that liberal rights talk tradi-
tionally ignored. Legal relations that impose responsibilities
upon rightholders to respect cultural otherness focuses upon the
interest of Native Peoples in that otherness. It also highlights
the social and political conditions that would have prevailed in
102. On the denial of legal status to Native fishing interests, see Shelley D. Turner,
The Native American's Right to Hunt and Fish: An Overview of the Aboriginal Spiritual
and Mystical Belief System, the Effect of European Contact, and the Continuing Fight to
Observe a Way of Life, 19 N.M. L. REv. 377 (1989); Monroe E. Price, A Moment in His-
tory: The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 8 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 89 (1979). See
also Stuart Gilby, The Aboriginal Right to a Commercial Fishery, 4 DALHousiE J. LEGAL
STUD. 231 (1995); PoucY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF ABORIGINAL FisHING, DEPARTMENT OF
FisHERIEs AND OcEANs (Ottawa: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1991).
103. On the appreciation of this inequitable treatment which the law accords Native
Peoples, see Note, Towards a Group Rights Theory for Remedying Harm to the Subsis-
tence Culture of Alaska Natives, 12 ALAsKA L. REv. 295 (1995); Kevin J. Worten, One
Small Step for Courts, One Giant Leap for Group Rights: Accommodating the Associa-
tional Role of "Intimate" Government Entities, 71 N.C. L. REv. 595 (1993); Randy
Kapashesit & Murray Klippenstein, Aboriginal Group Rights and Environmental Protec-
tion, 36 McGILL L. J. 925 (1991); David S. Case, Subsistence and Self-Determination:
Can Alaska Natives Have a More "Effective" Voice?, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 1009 (1989).
104. PAUL Ricomt, HISTORY AND TRIuTH 278 (Charles A. Kelbey trans., 1965).
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the absence of such responsibilities. This evaluation of rights in
light of responsibilities is developed in the section below.
A. Reformulating Legal Relationships
Transforming legal relations involves shifting from a con-
ception of rights limited only externally by the rights of others to
a conception of rights limited internally by responsibilities that
inhere in the values underlying those rights. A duty is an exter-
nal restriction upon a right in that it requires that others, not
limited to the State, respect that right. A responsibility is an in-
ternal restriction upon a right in stipulating that the
rightholder respect the interests of others who are detrimentally
affected by the exercise of that right.10 5
Illustrating a legal relationship between a right and a duty,
a mining company has a right to use its property as it wishes; a
Native Person has a duty to respect that right in that she may
not interfere with its exercise. The restriction upon the mining
company's right to use that property arises either by statute or
on account of the rights of others, including Native Persons. In
imposing duties upon a mining company, its rights are limited
externally in accordance with the rights of those others.
A legal relationship arises between a right and a responsi-
bility when a right is subject to a responsibility for its impact
upon the interests of others. For example, a right to use one's
property to mine is restricted by responsibilities towards Native
Persons whose interests are detrimentally affected by the exer-
cise of that right. This restriction is internal to the right: it de-
rives, not from duties of the mining company that are contin-
gent upon the rights of others, but from the assertion of the
mining right itself.10 6
The recognition that a responsibility is internal to a right
aims at averting the use of a right to secure a benefit, while giv-
ing nothing in return. In effect, a right should not be used to ob-
tain a "free lunch" For example, a mining company should not
receive a "free lunch" in receiving value from land, while giving
nothing to Native Persons whose interests are detrimentally af-
fected by its use of that land. Eradicating its "free lunch" arises
105. See supra Part 11.
106. While reference here is made to the property rights of corporations to fish,
mine and cut timber, in Hohfeldian terms, such corporations more often exercise a privi-
lege. That privilege ordinarily arises as a matter of status, for example, in terms of leg-
islation or administrative regulation allowing for the exercise of that right, subject to
satisfying pertinent administrative requirements. On the relationship between rights
and privileges in the Hohfeldian schema, see supra Part HA
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variously, by denying it the benefit of land that has incommen-
surable value to Native Peoples, by permitting it to use that
land only on condition that it not destroy, erode, or otherwise
undermine the value of that land to Native Peoples, or by re-
quiring that it compensate Native Persons for the loss in land
value to them.
Conceiving of rights and responsibilities in this way allows
a different balance to be struck among competing cultural inter-
ests than those that are possible under Hohfeld's analysis. In
particular, it extends Hohfeld's legal relations by encompassing
the cultural, including property interests of Native Peoples that
are not themselves recognized as rights. For example, it limits
the rights of a mining company in light of its responsibilities not
to infringe the interests of Native Peoples in land, that are not
treated formally as rights. 07 This reformulation of basic legal re-
lations occurs when a mining company's right to use its property
at will is internally restricted by a responsibility to preserve
wildlife stocks in favor of Native interests that are deemed not
to constitute liberal rights. In this way, Native interests are ac-
corded legal recognition, even though they do not constitute
rights, privileges, powers or immunities. 08 Similarly, the exer-
cise of Non-Native rights are subject to Native interests that are
neither rights, nor the subject of statutory duties.
Placing the internal restriction of a responsibility upon a
right modifies Hohfeld's basic relations in different respects.
First, Non-Native Persons are responsible to respect Native in-
terests that are not represented by Hohfeldian rights, privileges,
powers, or immunities. These interests range from preserving a
distinct Native language to protecting a particular forest from
commercial defoliation. 0 9 Second, the responsibility that at-
taches to a right is intended to protect underrepresented or un-
represented interests, such as cultural interests that are not
limited to the rights of a plurality of individuals. For example,
the responsibility of a mining company not to exercise its rights
in a manner that damages the environment is directed at,
107. This restricts B's rights, notwithstanding the fact that B's rights are not lim-
ited by A's rights, nor by any duty which B owes A. See supra Table p. 216.
108. It is true that legislation subjects corporate rights to the environmental inter-
ests of others. However, unlike responsibilities, that result is contingent upon govern-
mental action that is external to those corporate rights.
109. On the relationship between individual and community rights or interests in
respect of distinct cultural communities, see EmIoNI, supra note 15; Leon E. Trakman,
Group Rights: A Canadian Perspective, 24 N.Y. J. hr'L L. & POL. 1579 (1992); TRAIAN,
supra note 15, ch. 3; McDonald, supra note 52; Johnston, supra note 52; Van Dyke,
supra note 52.
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among other concerns, preserving a traditional way of life of Na-
tive Peoples, that includes bands, clans and individual mem-
bers. 10 Third, the nature and strength of this responsibility var-
ies in accordance with the rightholder's foresight of the
detrimental effect of the exercise of his right upon the interests
of others. For example, the responsibility of a company engaged
in forestry expands for persistently devastating forest land upon
which Native Peoples depend for their survival or sustenance.'
Fourth, the nature of the responsibilities owed are affected by
the communal context that surrounds the exercise of rights. In-
cluded in this context, for instance, is a history of conquest, eco-
nomic exploitation and cultural assimilation of Native Peoples." 2
Finally, responsibilities influence the attributes and quality of
life within a cultural community. For example, a Native commu-
nities' interests are adversely affected by the exercise of mining
rights on their traditional hunting grounds. The band consti-
tutes a community that is united by a shared interest in tradi-
tional hunting and also, by the responsibilities which the mining
company owes them collectively on account of those interests.
Responsibilities are aspects of rights that take account of
the cultural conditions under which those rights are exercised.
For example, the rights of a Non-Native mining company to
strip-mine may take into account Native values, such as those
relating to a traditional way of life on land that is adversely af-
fected by that strip-mining. Similarly, Non-Native interests may
be the object of responsibilities arising on account of the exer-
cise of Native rights that have a detrimental impact upon these
commercial interests."3 For instance, the extent of protection ac-
corded commercial interests in hunting and fishing may depend,
in part, upon the nature of Native rights in that land and the
detrimental effect from the exercise of rights upon those
interests.
The extent of protection accorded Native interests that are
the object of responsibilities hinges upon the ability of legisla-
110. Responsibilities attach to powers and immunities as well. However, the goal
here is not to identify the full spectrum of legal relations, but to decide how rights like
the Native interest in land, ought to be construed. On powers and immunities within
Hohfeld's schema, see supra p. 215.
111. For illustrations of the responsibilities of industry towards Native Peoples in
particular, see infra Part IV.B.
112. On the problems of political denial and cultural assimilation of Native Peoples,
see GARY ORFIEL, A STUDY OF THE TERmNATION PoLIcY ch. 6 (1965). See also supra Part
I.
113. On the virtue of orienting rights around a social context that includes responsi-
bilities, see Trakman, supra note 13.
Winter 1997]
222 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
tors, courts and administrators to take account of the cultural
otherness of Native Peoples. It also depends upon a willingness
of lawmakers to acknowledge that the historical treatment ac-
corded such Peoples often justifies endorsing stronger Native in-
terests and weaker Native responsibilities. This is especially so
given the capacity of Non-Native Persons to further empower
themselves through their rights at the expense of Native Peo-
ples. This need to promote Native interests also stems from a
living history in which Native interests have been largely ex-
cluded from a liberal rights discourse that affirms tolerance to-
wards others,'1 while denying its own constitutional roots as a
"living tree"115 that is tolerant of cultural differences.
This requirement that legal right-holders recognize interests
such as the interests of Native Peoples which do not constitute
rights, is depicted in the table below:
Basic Legal Relation Opposite Correlative
Right Responsibility No-Right Duty
A's claim against B A's As lack of B's obligation
responsibility claim against B to respect A's
to respect B's claim
(and others')
interest in the
exercise of A's
right
Privilege Responsibility Duty No-right
A's freedom from A's A's obligation B's lack of claim
claim of B responsibility to respect B's against A
to respect B's claim
(and others')
interest in the
exercise of A's
freedom
Regarding basic legal relations, A has a right or claim against
B. Internal to As right is her responsibility to respect the inter-
ests of B, for instance a Native Person, in the exercise of her
right. A's privilege consists of her freedom from B's claim. Inter-
nal to A's privilege is her responsibility to respect the interests
of B and others like B in the exercise of her freedom.
114. The assumption, here, is that decision-makers will recognize that the interests
of Native Peoples historically were not treated as rights, or that, while Native interests
were accorded the status of rights, these rights were construed restrictively in practice.
115. The conception of constitutional law as a "living tree" stresses that the legal
system should evolve in light of changing social values, including the values accorded to
human rights. For a detailed application of the "living tree" doctrine to the political
rights of women in Canadian Law, see Henrietta Muir Edwards v. Attorney General for
Canada [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) [hereinafter the "Persons Case"].
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B. Extending the Application of Legal Relationships
Basic legal relations, as is evident in Hohfeld's analysis,
arise only when social interests constitute rights, privileges, re-
sponsibilities and no-rights, or their opposites and correla-
tives.116 These basic relations fail to reckon with the conflict and
subordination of Native interests that arises when their cultural
otherness is excluded from such basic relations. In effect, "[tihe
cultural framework for collective rights claims is predisposed to
insensitivity to the cultural system which Native Peoples believe
in and live by."" 7
The alternative is to identify the subordinating effect that
liberal rights have had upon Native interests, to evaluate the
nature of the interests affected and to construct legal responsi-
bilities that mitigate that subordinating effect. One illustration
of a court according weight to the historical interests of Native
Peoples is the recent decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court,
in R. v. Denny."8 There, the Court stated:
The salmon fishery is entitled to be protected so that it may continue to
thrive and prosper for the benefit of all who fish the waters salmon in-
habit. This includes the right to license and to prohibit unsavory prac-
tices in the manner by which fish are caught. It includes as well, the
right to require native Indians to be licensed to fish for food in waters
adjacent to Reserve lands ... Reasonable regulation for these purposes
suggested in this paragraph will not be inconsistent with those rights
but rather will achieve valid objectives that are in the interests of the
native people and the preservation and enhancement of the fishery. 19
Extending the Court's reasoning to encompass the modified
analysis proposed here, both Native and Non-native Peoples
have the right to exploit the salmon fishery. Both are responsi-
ble not to exercise those rights in a manner that adversely im-
pacts upon the other. However, given the subordinating effect of
salmon fishing rights upon Native Peoples in general, those
claiming a commercial right to fish for salmon have a greater
responsibility to avert that adverse impact upon Native Peoples.
116. On such basic relations, see supra Part H.
117. Mary E. Turpel, Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter, 6 CAN. HUMAN
RIGHTS YEARBOOK 4, 12 (1989-90).
118. [1990] 94 N.S.R. (2d) 253 (N.S.C-).
119. Id. at 268. The reasoning in this case found approval with the Supreme Court
of Canada in R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. While the Court in Denny draws atten-
tion to Native rights and Non-Native interests, rather than vice versa, it did extend lib-
eral conceptions of rights to encompass the Mikmaq's historical right to exploit the fish-
ery. On the extension of liberal values to Native Peoples, see Turpel supra note 117.
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The State, in turn, has the responsibility to ensure that such re-
sponsibilities are defined and fulfilled in a reasonable manner
through regulations and prohibitions, notably, through the
grant, denial and regulation of fishing licenses. In developing
these regulations, the State ideally should work with Native
Peoples and others having interests in the resource, rather than
develop regulations in isolation and then impose them on the
parties. 20
In requiring both the State and corporate right-holders to
exercise their rights responsibly, Native Peoples acquire a legal
remedy not previously available to them under traditional lib-
eral rights. The manner in which reconstituted rights can pro-
vide Native Peoples with such a legal remedy is set out in the
table below, dealing with fishing rights arising in the case of R.
v. Denny:
Illustration: R. v. Denny Inter-Party Dimension
using the reconstructive
approach
Native (A) Legal Non-Native (B) Legal
Relations Relations
Situation 1 Native individual responsibility to duty to respect A's
or group (A) exercise right in right
exercises regard of B's
traditional salmon claim/interest in
fishing right salmon fishery
Situation 2 Non-Native duty to respect B's responsibility to
individual or group right exercise right in
(B) exercises right regard of A's
to catch salmon claim/interest in
commercially salmon fishery
In situation 1, individuals or groups of Native Peoples enjoy
traditional fishing rights and Non-Native Peoples have a duty to
respect the exercise of those rights. This reflects a liberal right/
duty relationship between them. However, Native Peoples have
a responsibility to pay due respect to the claim or interest of
Non-Native communities in that fishery in the exercise of their
rights. This extends their legal relationship. In situation 2, Non-
Native individuals or groups have a right to catch salmon com-
mercially and Native Peoples have a duty to respect that right.
However, Non-Natives have a responsibility to exercise their
120. This does not infer that all responsibilities towards Native Peoples should be
subject to governmental regulation from the outset. It does infer that governments
should be responsible to ensure that responsibilities towards Native Peoples are fulfilled
in a reasonable manner. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.
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fishing rights with due regard to the interests of Native
Peoples.2 1
An extended legal relationship also arises between the State
and Native and Non-Native Peoples. The State has the right to
enact and apply regulations directed at preserving and enhanc-
ing the fishery.m The State is also responsible to ensure that its
regulations are reasonable in nature. This includes ensuring
their even-handed effect upon Native and Non-Native Peoples
respectively. Both Native and Non-Native Peoples, in turn, are
legally bound to comply with these regulations.
This approach offers several distinct benefits: it grounds the
exercise of rights in the context of specific relations. It allows for
variable, as distinct from all-or-nothing remedies; and it ensures
that responsibilities change according to whether they are di-
rected at emerging or receding interests.m For example, deter-
mining that a commercial fishing fleet has acted irresponsibly in
relation to Native Peoples may give rise to flexible rather than
all-or-nothing remedies. Fishing rights may be suspended rather
than revoked, a fishing operation may be subject to a temporary
rather than a permanent injunction, etc. Responsibilities may
also be based upon the specific nature of different relationships.
For example, the State may impose responsibilities upon the
commercial fishing industry in general, or upon a specific com-
mercial fishery, according to the detrimental effect of the right
exercised by each. Responsibilities may also diverge according to
whether they are owed to Native Peoples as a whole, or to Na-
tive bands or particular individuals2 4 For example, recognition
may be accorded to Native property interests in general, or to
the property claims of specific Native bands or Peoples. Respon-
sibilities may vary further according to whether they are di-
rected at emerging or receding property interests.M For exam-
ple, responsibilities may be reduced in the face of the receding
121. For convenience, we refer to the "right" of Native Peoples in the fishery. How-
ever, the "right" to fish traditionally is more properly referred to as a "privilege," in
Hohfeld's terminology. See supra Part H1A
122. For convenience, we refer to the "right" of the State, although the State's right
is more accurately referred to as a "power." See supra Part H.A
123. Emerging interests encompass interests that are deemed to be evolving and
often, progressive, in the cultural community in which they arise. An emerging interest,
for example, may encompass the desire of Native Peoples to develop innovative methods
of fishing. A receding, but not necessarily regressive interest, may include the interest in
preserving a traditional Native method of hunting or fishing.
124. See supra Part Hi.A
125. See supra note 123.
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interests of Native Peoples in the fishery and expanded in the
presence of their emerging interests.126 Finally, rights and re-
sponsibilities may be exercised with the cooperation and support
of rightholders themselves. 127 For example, oil companies like
Syncrude Canada may invite Native Peoples to participate in
corporate decision-making; it may fund the economic renewal
programs of Native bands; it may also develop programs aimed
at educating its employees in the traditions, customs and prac-
tices of particular Native Peoples. 28 This modified approach to-
wards rights may allow for the development of innovative ways
in which the State, Native and Non-Native Peoples contribute to
the enjoyment of their distinct ways of life. A further benefit
may be the growing acceptance of responsibilities that are owed
to Native Peoples in consequence of the State's right to govern
and also, to offset the privileges it has granted to industry his-
torically. 9 Yet another benefit may be to redress the dissatisfac-
tion among Native Peoples, aggravated by secessionism, that lib-
eral rights have effectively marginalized their interest in
economic, social and political self-determination. 130 Most impor-
126. This introduces a tension among different conceptions of interest, but it also al-
lows those conceptions to be explored in a manner that liberal conceptions of rights, for-
mulated in disregard of interests varying from rights, do not. To avoid the impact of lib-
eral patriarchy in determining whether the interests of Native Peoples are emerging or
receding, such determinations may be derived from the perspective of Native communi-
ties themselves, rather than be imputed to them by fiat.
127. Attempts to conciliate between short and longer term interests in land, as
among other resources, is common in economic libertarian thought, notably within con-
servative economic theory. One can question, however, the extent to which this conserva-
tive school of thought identifies and weighs economic interests selectively, on the basis
of its libertarian values. See generally Alan Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, In-
formation Costs, and Economic Organization, AMER. EcoN. REv. 52 (1972); Oliver E. Wil-
ianson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L.
& ECON. 233 (1979); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOmIcA 386. But see
PEm A- KROPOTKIN, MUTUAL AID AS A FACTOR IN EVOLUTION (1989).
128. See, ag., SYNCRUDE CANADA, LTD., A REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYN-
CRUDE CANADA LTD. AND THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLE OF NORTHEASTERN ALBERTA, ABORIGINAL
REv. 1, 28 (1994).
129. The emphasis, here, upon responsibilities the State owes to individuals is in-
tended to stress that interests which are not treated as rights should be the subject of
responsibilities, regardless of whether those interests attach to individuals or a cultural
community. See supra Part HI.A.
130. On the claims of cultural minorities to secede from the State, see, e.g., SOVER-
EIGN TNJUSTICE, FORCIBLE INCLUSION OF THE JAMES BAY CREES AND CREE TERRITORY INTO A
SOvEREIGN QUEBEC (Grand Council of the Crees, 1995); ROBERT YOUNG, THE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA (1995); MiLCA Z. BoomAN, THE ECONOMICS OF SE-
CESSION (1992); Allen Buchanan, Self-Determination and the Right to Secede, 45 J. INVL
AFF. 347 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHL L. REv.
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tantly, this approach may lead to the shared realization that, in
place of an untrammelled right to consume the resources of the
earth at will, the State, corporations and Native Peoples alike
have a shared responsibility towards one another for the use of
that earth. That responsibility is fulfilled by reconstituting
rights in response to that realization.131
A particular challenge to this modified conception of rights
may arise when the interests of Native Peoples are fragmented,
when Native Peoples disagree as to the value of their traditions
and when they vary as to the manner in which those traditions
should be reconciled with Non-Native interests. This is espe-
cially problematic in the face of an intersection of difference be-
tween the interests of individuals and sub-communities of Na-
tive Peoples. For example, some individuals within a band may
insist upon a traditional right to fish; others may argue for com-
mercial fishing. Some may forsake their traditional interests in
return for compensation; others may decline to do so.
This problem of the intersection of different Native interests
is especially evident in family and personal property cases. One
illustration revolves around the adoption of Native children into
Non-Native families. For example, in the Mi'kmaq culture of
North Eastern United States and Eastern Canada, a grand-
mother plays an important role both as an individual and as a
pivotal member of the family. If there is a conflict over the adop-
tion of a Mikmaq child between a Mi'kmaq mother living within
the Mikmaq community, a Mi'kmaq grandmother living outside
of that community and a Non-Native father, the responsibilities
of each derives from balancing the competing personal and prop-
erty interests of groups and individuals. 32 The problem is that
633 (1991); Allen Buchanan, Towards A Theory of Secession, 1991 ETHIcs 362 (1991);
Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YAU J.
INTL L. 177 (1991); ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE
FROM FORT SUMTER TO LrrHUANiA AND QUEBEC (1991); GREGORY CRAVEN, SECESSION: THE
ULTIMATE STATES RIGHT (1986); LEE C. BucHHErT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-
DETERMINATION (1978).
131. In attempting to modify the structures of liberalism, this approach is post-
structural in nature. For a general attempt to transform liberalism along post-modern,
more than post-structural, lines, see Richard Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,
80 J. PMI. 583 (1983). While neo-modern liberals have invoked pragmatism to justify in-
dividual rights directed at excluding the State, post-modernists like Rorty have used
pragmatism to advance a non-individualist structure of rights aimed at recognition of
community interests. Id. On Rorty's critique of liberalism generally, see RICHARD RORTy,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SoLIDARITY (1989).
132. The Non-Native father may very well have his own conceptions of child-rearing
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neither Western liberal rights, nor the recognition of responsibil-
ities within rights provide a clear solution on their face. Apply-
ing a liberal conception of rights, the mother's "right", for exam-
ple, to give her children up to adoption, is limited to her
individual right as a mother, as distinct from her personal and
property interest as a member of a band, tribe, or People. Her
cultural interest, the cultural interest of the band and the
grandmother are all excluded on grounds that they constitute
interests that vary from liberal rights.133
Imposing responsibilities upon rightholders for interests
that are detrimentally affected by the exercise of rights does
not, in itself, resolve this dilemma. The existence of a responsi-
bility limiting a right does not determine which personal or
property interests ought to prevail, nor how they ought to relate
to interests that are conceived as rights. For example, the exis-
tence of responsibilities accords recognition to the personal in-
terests of the mother, grandmother and band in child-rearing;
but it does not provide a means of resolving conflicts among
such personal interests. Nor does it resolve conflicts between the
right of the mother and these different personal interests in
child-rearing.
One solution is to require rights to be evaluated in light of
the nature of interests which those rights affect. This can per-
mit consideration of the values and interests of different cul-
tural groups. It can also provide for a range of possible responsi-
bilities, depending upon the nature of those interests, the
character of the rights that impinge upon them and the respon-
sibilities that arise on account of them. For example, a personal
or property interest affected by a right could give rise to, among
other remedies, the expectation that a Native child adopted into
that are at odds with those of the Mi'kmaq Peoples. The mother, as well as other mem-
bers of her community, may have a strong interest in seeing the child raised within the
community in the traditional way. Finally, the grandmother may share many of the val-
ues of fellow Milkmaq Peoples, but may have her own conceptions as to how to raise the
child in respect to her role in child-rearing.
133. See generally BILLY JOE JONES, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBooK: A
LEGAL GuEDE TO THE CusroDY AND ADOPIION OF NATIVE ANERICAN CHILDREN (1995); De-
nise L. Stiffarm, The Indian Child Welfare Act: The Determination of Good Cause to De-
part from the Statutory Placement Preferences, 70 WASHL L. REv. 1151 (1995). For a crea-
tive approach towards the treatment of Indian children in Canada, see, e.g., Mooswa v.
Minister of Social Services [1976] 30 R.F.L. 101, 102 (Sask. Q.B.). But see Erik W.
Aamot-Snapp, Note, When Judicial Flexibility Becomes Abuse of Discretion: Eliminating
the "Good Cause" Exception in Indian Child Welfare Act Adoptive Placements, 79 MMN.
L REv. 1167 (1995).
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a Non-Native family not lose her traditional tribal, family and
property benefits. 134 This could justify imposing responsibilities
upon adoptive parents to expose that child to tribal traditions
through visitation rights, while rendering the band responsible
to provide that child with band benefits. It could also warrant
giving different weights to interests in light of discrete cultural
relations, such as the relationship between grandmother and
grandchildren in Mi'kmaq society.'315 It could justify, as well, giv-
ing consideration to interpersonal relations, such as among birth
mother, adoptive parent, child and tribe.
Envisaging rights and responsibilities in this way recognizes
that, what is in the best interests of the child, is contingent
upon the intersection of different community values which them-
selves may be in conflict. This warrants giving consideration to
different personal and property interests in light of that inter-
section of difference. It also justifies paying regard to rights,
such as the mother's right to give a child up for adoption. This
analysis of rights and responsibilities is unfolded below.
V. IhIPLEMENTING TRANSFORMED RELATIONSHIPS
One problem arising in the reconstruction of rights is a con-
flict between rights and interests. For example, a corporation's
right to use land for industrial purposes potentially conflicts
with the interest of Native Peoples in preserving that land for
traditional use. The problem is neither approach leads to a sat-
isfying result from the perspective of the other. Applying a lib-
eral conception of rights likely leads to the triumph of industrial
use of land over its preservation. Applying an expansive concep-
tion of responsibility likely leads to preserving that land at the
expense of its industrial use.
A neo-Hohfeldian construction of rights regards the preser-
vation of Native burial sites as sufficiently important to consti-
tute rights. This is justified on two grounds. First, according
rights to Native Peoples still imposes responsibilities upon them
to respect the interests of others, including other Native Peoples
who are interested in industrial expansion on affected land.2 6
Second, Native interests in the industrial use of land may con-
134. The word "property," here, includes the interests of Native Peoples in the use
and enjoyment of the fruits of the land, including its preservation for the use and enjoy-
ment of future generations.
135. See, e.g., Isaac v. Denny, [1993] 47 R.F.L. (3d) 164 (N.S.CA), where the court
allowed testimony of the role of the grandmother in Milunaq culture.
136. For a methodology recording that accommodation, see infra Part IVA.
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stitute rights; and as such, they are already the subject of legal
protection.
A reconstructive solution is to subject rights in land to re-
sponsibilities and further, to render those rights contingent
upon the nature of affected interests. This warrants providing
for a range of possible responsibilities, depending upon the na-
ture of the interests involved, the character of the rights that
impinge upon those interests and the responsibilities that arise
on account of them. It also justifies paying regard to different
conceptions of rights and interests adhered to by mainstream
and Native Peoples alike. This analysis of rights and responsi-
bilities is developed below. 37
A. A Transformative Methodology
Key to the development of modified legal relations is the
need to determine the nature of relations between rights and re-
sponsibilities, the intersection of differences among those rela-
tions and their application in specific cases. The intention is
first, to identify the processes that govern the relationship be-
tween rights and responsibilities and second, to apply those
processes to an illustration, here, Native land claims. In this il-
lustration, a company threatens to exploit resources at the ex-
pense of Native interests in the affected land. This arises, for
example, when a lumber company clear-cuts trees, a mining
company strip-mines land, or a commercial fishery depletes fish
stocks.138 As preliminary matters, rights are grounded in norms
that are attributed content prior to their being applied to partic-
ular situations. In contrast, responsibilities acquire their content
from the values that arise in the exercise or application of
rights. This means that, while a right has an a priori content,
the nature of a responsibility derives from empirical experience.
This experience, in turn, is acquired from studying past practice
with rights and applying that practice to new situations. Consis-
tent with common law reasoning and judicial precedent, a re-
137. This analysis can be applied in various contexts. While it is applied here pri-
marily to rights and responsibilities appertaining to land claims, it can be applied to all
rights and freedoms, including the personal liberties of Native Peoples. On a Mi'Kmaq il-
lustration of such personal liberties, see supra Part Ill.B.
138. This analysis can be applied in various contexts. While it is applied here to
rights and responsibilities relating to the land claims of Native Peoples, it can be ap-
plied to all rights and freedoms. An extensive analysis into the philosophical underpin-
nings and application of rights and responsibilities, encompassing such topics as repro-
ductive choice, free speech and environmental protection, is developed in LEON TRAKfAN
& SEAN GATmN, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBIUmEs (forthcoming 1997).
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sponsibility is determined in virtue of a relationship among spe-
cific actors functioning within a particular environment.
Operating within a dynamic legal framework, the nature of
those responsibilities hinges upon the variable values and inter-
ests, as distinct from values fixed in a pre-existing legal
structure.139
These principles ground the relationship between rights and
responsibilities. Responsibilities are contingent upon rights:
therefore, it is necessary to determine the nature of those
rights, the consequences that derive from that exercise and the
values and interests that are affected by their exercise. In the
event that the values and interests not treated as rights are in-
adequately protected in law, it is necessary to determine the na-
ture of the responsibilities that are owed on account of that in-
adequacy. This determination is arrived at by comparing the
values underlying rights to the values and interests that are in-
adequately protected in law in consequence of the exercise of
those rights. The final step is to give legal effect to responsibili-
ties, inter alia, through legislation, judicial interpretation, or
agreement between the parties.140 This relationship between
rights and responsibilities is outlined in more detail below.
I. Determining relationships: who and what has rights
A. identifying the primary parties
B. identifying the affected parties
H. Determining the legal issues, including the content of rights
A. their formal, legal content
B. their substantive content, including the reason why a
party asserts rights and interests
Il. Determining the content of responsibilities, including
A. the substantive and contingent values and interests
that are affected by the assertion of rights
B. the values and interests that mitigate against rights
139. This empirical experience is most apparent in the development and application
of equitable doctrines in the common law. See generally JILL E. MARTiN, MODERN EQuITY
3-45 (1993).
140. The methodology can be applied in practice in two different ways: descriptively,
as the way a decision-maker applies it in practice, regardless of the normative virtue of
that application; and by attributing idealized norms to the practice. As an example of
the latter, it may be idealized that the legislature or courts would support imposing par-
ticular types of responsibilities upon the State in favor of Native Peoples. See infra Part
I.B.
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IV. Determining the weight to be accorded to rights in light of
A. the values and interests at stake
B. the urgency and other means that are available to fur-
ther these values and interests
V. Determining the weight to be accorded to responsibilities in
light of
A. the values and interests at stake
B. the urgency and other means that are available to fur-
ther those values, and interests.
VI. Determining how the values and interests in IV and V are
represented in the modified legal framework with a view to
establishing
A. the adequacy of rights and duties
B. the adequacy of responsibilities
VII. Determining how rights, duties and responsibilities ought
to be construed in law in light of
A. statute
B. judicial action, including statutory interpretation
C. administrative action
D. political convention or negotiated settlement
E. custom, usage and practice
F. moral suasion
This methodology is applied to rights, duties and responsi-
bilities affecting Native land claims. Two issues arise for consid-
eration: determining the nature of Native interests in a hypo-
thetical land claim; and determining the responsibility owed in
consequence of the exercise of property rights that intrude upon
Native interests in that land.
As the schema above outlines, it is necessary first, to iden-
tify the parties to whom rights and responsibilities attach in
consequence of the Native land claim. The primary parties to
the hypothetical relationship are an oil exploration company and
a Native band. The affected parties with rights, duties and re-
sponsibilities are, among others, the State, provincial and terri-
torial governments, Native Persons who are not affiliated with
Native bands'41 and Non-Native Persons.'4
141. "Non-status Indians", for example, are not ordinarily affiliated with "Status In-
dians" and therefore enjoy a different legal status, notably in Canada. See, eg., William
Pentley, The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982:
Part I-The Interpretive Prism of Section 35, 22 UJB.C.L REV. 21 (1988); Part If-Section
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The assertion of rights and responsibilities ordinarily works
as follows. An oil exploration company claims a property right to
explore for oil on specified land and Native Peoples claim an his-
torical interest in the preservation and use of that land. The oil
company grounds its claim in a Western liberal conception of
rights. Native Peoples frame their interest in that land on an
historical title and also on a claim to self-determination. 143
Second, it is necessary to determine the formal legal and
substantive content of the rights claimed by the oil company.
This includes establishing the nature of its legal title, and the
formal conditions governing the exercise of its property rights.
Third, it is necessary to evaluate the responsibilities owed
to Native Peoples on account of the oil company's right to ex-
plore for oil. This may include, as a formal claim, Native Peoples
asserting an historical interest in land taken from them by con-
quest, occupation or cession.'" It may also include, as a sub-
stantive claim, their interest in self-determination in further-
ance of their particular ways of life.145
Fourth, it is necessary to determine the weight to be ac-
corded to the property rights of the oil company in accordance
35: The Substantive Guarantee, 22 UB.C.L. REv. 207 (1988); Menno Boldt & J. Anthony
Long, Tribal Traditions and European-Western Political Ideologies: The Dilemma of Ca-
nada's Native Indians, in THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND ABORIGINAL
RIGHTS 333, 333-46 (Menno Boldt & J. Anthony Long eds., 1985) [hereinafter QuEsT FOR
JUSTICE]; DIAMom JENNESS, THE INDIANS OF CANADA (1963).
142. Such as mining and lumber corporations engaged in commercial and industrial
activities on land otherwise occupied or used by Native Peoples. For illustrations of co-
operative schemes among the State, Native Peoples and corporations, see infra Part
IVB.
143. On the interest of Native Peoples in self-determination, see Brian Slattery, The
Paradoxes of National Self-Determination, 32 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 703 (1995); Khayyam
Zev Paltiel, Group Rights in the Canadian Constitution and Aboriginal Claims to Self-
Determination, in ROBERT J. JACKSON, CONTEMPORARY CANADIAN POLICS: READINGS AND
NOTES (1987); Evelyn Kallen, Ethnicity and Collective Rights in Canada, in ETHNIC CA-
NADA 318, 318-36 (Leo Driedger ed., 1987); JOHN WEINSTEIN, ABORIGINAL SELF-
DETERMINATION OF A LAND BASE (1986).
144. For example, formal recognition within a United Nations convention that a
particular Native Nation is self-determining might partially ground the responsibility of
the oil company in the exercise of its rights.
145. This substantive aspect of the right to self-determination is very controversial,
especially because it gives rise to claims by Native Peoples for the redistribution of
wealth from the Nation State to self-determining Native Nations. See Gudmundur Al-
fredsson, The Right of Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples, in MODERN LAW OF
SELF-DETERmNATION 41, 41-54 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); S. James Anaya, A Con-
temporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination, 3 TRANSNATL L. &
CONTEMP. PRORS. 131 (1993); Guyora Binder, The Case for Self-Determination, 29 STAN. J.
INr'L L 223 (1993); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, 17 YALE J. INVL LAw 539 (1992); Buchanan, supra note 130.
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with the values and interests that support them. The values at
stake for that company are generally commercial: increased
profit and economic prosperity. The urgency with which it as-
serts its commercial interests depends upon its economic situa-
tion and the likely impact of imposing responsibilities upon it.
Fifth, it is necessary to determine the weight to be accorded
to responsibilities owed to Native Peoples in accordance with the
values and interests that support their interests in the affected
land. The values at stake for Native communities are cultural
and implicitly, commercial: maintaining a traditional way of life
and benefitting from economic development on that land. These
values may be the subject of conflicting interests. Some Native
Peoples may resist oil exploration as a threat to their traditional
way of life. Others may accommodate it in return for a share of
profits. Still others may favor it only when their traditional way
of life is safeguarded. The urgency underlying these interests
depends upon, among other issues, the actual and perceived
threat of oil exploration to a traditional way of life and economic
conditions among Native Peoples.
Sixth, it is necessary to determine how the values and in-
terests of the oil company and Native Peoples can be accommo-
dated within a modified legal framework. This requires evaluat-
ing the adequacy of their rights and duties and failing that, the
adequacy of responsibilities owed by and to Native Peoples. This
inquiry includes assessing, in sequence, whether Native Peoples
have rights, whether the oil exploration company has a duty to
respect those rights, and the extent to which the oil company's
duties adequately accommodate the values and interests of Na-
tive Peoples. For example, Native Peoples may have rights in
land earmarked for oil drilling and the company may have a
duty to respect those rights. In the event that Native values and
interests are adequately protected in law by such means, it may
be unnecessary to continue with the analysis. In the event that
those values and interests are not adequately protected, when
Native Peoples lack legal title to land, it is necessary to deter-
mine the responsibilities owed by the oil company to Native Peo-
ples arising from the exercise of its rights. This may include de-
termining the extent to which it is responsible to consult with
Native Peoples, assess the impact of oil exploration upon them,
modify its practices in light of that impact and compensate them
on account of that impact.'4
146. On collaborative schemes involving government, Native Peoples and industry,
see infra Part MB.
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Seventh, it is necessary to determine how a modified con-
ception of rights, duties and responsibilities should be consti-
tuted in legal practice. Rights and duties, set out in statute, con-
tract and case law, may be modified to accommodate
responsibilities within reconstituted legal relations. Such rela-
tions, in turn, may accord varying degrees of recognition to in-
terests not protected by rights. For example, some form of recog-
nition may be accorded to Native land claims. Determining the
nature and extent of that recognition, in turn, will depend upon
the social and legal context in which both function.147
B. A Transformative Illustration
There are a few examples of this transformative methodol-
ogy being practiced.1' One way in which to accommodate values
that are detrimentally affected by the exercise of rights is to de-
termine that those values themselves constitute rights, as dis-
tinct from interests. The rationale is that the values underlying
the interests are sufficiently important and the countervailing
exercise of rights sufficiently harmful to those values, to consti-
tute those values as rights. One example in which Native inter-
ests have been reconstituted as rights arose in a recent negoti-
ated settlement between the McLeod Lake Indian Band and the
Federal Government of Canada. 49 There, a 372 member band
and the Federal Government entered into negotiations that gave
rise to a variety of benefits for the McLeod Lake Band under a
treaty concluded in 1899, known as Treaty Eight. 50 Central to
the argument of the Band was its historical title in the land and
147. This methodology requires developing ways in which to weigh interests. For ex-
ample, Native interests that are detrimentally affected by rights may be weighted on the
basis of evidence of their social worth, such as according to evidence of harm arising
from exploring for oil on traditional tribal land. They may also be weighted according to
normative values, such as the value of a traditional way of life. While different methods
of evaluating interests are likely to arise in practice, Native interests are most likely to
be weighted normatively. This is because the final determinant of a responsibility rests
on the belief that it ought to have value. Just as one can claim that there ought to be a
right, one can also claim that there ought to be a responsibility.
148. The examples below include: the agreement negotiated between the McLeod
Lake Indian Band and the Federal Government of Canada and Co-Management
Schemes in general. Both are discussed infra in this Part.
149. These cooperative measures between government and Native Peoples ordinarily
include, among others, negotiation, joint ventures and co-management agreements. See,
e.g., PETER DOUGLAS ELIAS, DEVELOPMENT OF ABORIGINAL PEoPLE's Commusus (1995).
150. On the history and significance of Treaty Eight, see DENNIS MADILL, TREATY RE-
SEARCH REPORT: TREATY EIGHT (1986); Richard Daniel, The Spirit and Terms of Treaty
Eight, in THE SPmrr OF THE ALBERTA INDIAN TREATIES (Richard Price ed., 1979).
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the extent to which that title had been eroded by State spon-
sored industry, notably by clear-cutting the forests. As a result,
the McLeod Lake Band negotiation provided for co-management
of some of the land and also, for a negotiated settlement in
which each band member was to receive approximately 52 hect-
ares of land out of 19,000 hectares. 15 1 The Band as a whole also
received a $9 million settlement. In return, the Band assumed a
responsibility to share in the cost of settlement with the Federal
Government and the Province of British Columbia.1 2 In that
case the historical title of the Band was deemed to be so valua-
ble and the effect of commercial forestry so harmful to its inter-
ests, that it was accorded rights beyond interests. Given that a
co-management agreement was reached between both Federal
Government and the McLeod Lake Band, both assumed respon-
sibilities for the implementation of that agreement towards Na-
tive and Non-Native interest alike. 53
Co-management schemes, such as the one above, readily il-
lustrate the modified rights discourse developed in this article.154
Each party to the co-management scheme, in asserting rights,
151. One hectare is equal to approximately 2.47 acres.
152. For a discussion about the McLeod Lake Indian Band Settlement, see TiEas
COLONIsT, May 11, 1995.
153. An alternative and less drastic solution, under our modified schema, would be
to recognize the interest of the Band as sufficiently important to constrain the exercise
of commercial forestry rights and further, to statutorily protect the exercise of tradi-
tional forestry practices on the affected land. This alternative, however, does not appro-
priately recognize the historical interest of the Band in the forestry and the importance
of constituting its interest as a right, as distinct from an interest.
154. A co-management scheme is defined as:
a multi-party administrative arrangement in which decisionmaking powers are
shared between government agencies and local community decisionmaking bod-
ies. It is a form of public sector, third party decisionmaking in which the state
partially relinquishes it's control over public policy making, in exchange for a
new contractual relationship between itself, an existing user group and an es-
tablished or emerging third party.
See UNDERSTANDING CO-MANAGEMENT AS IT ExISrs IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT: THE FIRST STEP, PREPARED BY POLICY RESEARCH AND ANALY.
sis DIRECTORATE 14 (Apr. 1993) in SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND: FIRS NATIONS AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN SASKATCHEWAN (Oct. 1995). See also UNDER-
STANDING CO-MANAGEMENT, supra, Appendix VIII, for a summary of diand-funded co-
management proposals in Saskatchewan (as of September 1995); SASKATCHEWAN ENVI.
RONMENT AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT WORKING GROUP, A POLICY
FRAMEWORK; PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF SASKATCHEWAN'S ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES (Jan. 1995) in UNDERSTANDING CO-MANAGEMENT, supra, Appen-
dix X See also Evelyn Pinkerton, Attaining Better Fisheries Management Through Co-
management: Prospects, Problems and Propositions, in EVELYN PmKERTON, CO-OPERATIVE
MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL FISHERIES: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR IMPROVED MANAGEMENT AND COM.
MUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1989).
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assumes responsibilities not to disrupt the interests of others, or
in the event of doing so, to co-manage the risk of loss or harm
arising from that disruption. For example, a forestry or strip-
mining company may assume a responsibility to co-manage its
activities with a Native band residing in the area. This may in-
volve the affected Native Band in management decisions, di-
rected at both the avoidance and resolution of disputes.
Co-operative schemes, not limited to co-management, pro-
vide parties with the opportunity to reconstitute their rights in
light of affected interests. They also enable the parties to do so
in a manner that reflects their particular relations, as distinct
from having values and interests imposed upon them. One bene-
fit is that parties to such relations can agree upon the nature
and limits of their respective rights and responsibilities in a
principled manner. Another, is their capacity to avoid the influ-
ence of patriarchy upon the parties, as when the State imposes
rights, duties and responsibilities upon them. A further benefit
is that the parties can rely upon a comprehensible method of de-
termining the nature of their respective rights and
responsibilities.
Seeking to arrive at co-managed solutions can also help to
develop legal processes which incorporate the cultural values
and interests of Native Peoples. For example, it may involve re-
sort to a talking circle in order to gauge the intensity of belief in
the detrimental impact of a forestry or strip-mining practice
upon Native life and to arrive at an accommodation which off-
sets that impact. This may still give rise to a Western style
method of negotiation, but that method may incorporate Native
values in the settlement process.
Co-operative schemes may enrich the quality of liberal soci-
ety by helping to manage the delicate balance between commer-
cial enterprise and traditional ways of life. They may also help
to protect the interests of sub-classes of persons, such as Native
women, whose interests differ from those of Native men. 155 How-
ever politically motivated they may be, corporations, too, may
acknowledge that, to exercise property rights in disregard of Na-
tive interests, can undermine the value of those rights. Illustrat-
ing this corporate view:
*.. we [Syncrude] understand the role our Aboriginal neighbors play as
stewards of the land. We too believe the land must remain safe, healthy
and enjoyable for future generations. It's a belief inspired by uniting the
155. For a discussion on the capacity of this modified analysis to take account of the
intersection of difference, including gender and racial difference, see supra Part LI.B.
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viewpoints of industry together with those of aboriginal society. It's a be-
lief in a common direction that benefits everyone.'5
The result may be a growing appreciation that Native inter-
ests are linked to the exercise of rights, not peripheral to them.
The benefit may be a greater appreciation of the role that "ab-
original neighbors play as stewards of the land"157 in the inter-
est of society at large.
The success of co-operative schemes ultimately depends
upon the seriousness with which the State, free enterprise cor-
porations and Native Peoples assume responsibilities on account
of the detrimental impact of rights upon the important interests
of others. 5 "
CONCLUSION
[RIespect for the autonomy of the members of minority cultures requires
respect for their cultural structure, and that in turn may require special
linguistic, educational and even political rights for minority cultures.1 9
156. See SYNCRUDE CANADA, LTD., A REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYNCRUDE
CANADA LTD. AND THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLE OF NORTHEASTERN ALBERTA, supra note 128, at
28.
157. Id. at 28.
158. This does not deny the "responsibility" to explain one's culture to those others
on the assumption that barriers to understanding otherness often are best resolved
through the participation of those who adhere to another culture. However, this respon-
sibility is a means by which the interests of cultural others may be elucidated upon in
arriving at a cooperative result between those with rights and those with interests not
recognized as rights. It is a not a responsibility that inheres within the right itself
159. Will Kyinlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS 883,
903 (1989). See also Will Kymlicka, Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity, 4 CAN.
J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 239 (1991). Appreciation of the virtue of political and cultural
self-determination among Native Peoples is readily apparent in the public reaction to
the Charlottetown Accord, reached between the Federal and Provincial Governments of
Canada on Aug. 28, 1992 in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada's birthplace.
One issue highlighted in that Accord was recognition of the right to Native self-
government. Opinion polls taken at that time indicated that the majority of Canadians
were in favor of acceding Native Canadians this right. Unfortunately, the Accord was a
"package" referendum which failed. The results of the failed national referendum on that
Accord, moving from the eastern to the western Provinces of Canada are: (1) Newfound-
land: 62.9% yes, 36.5% no. (2) Prince Edward Island: 73.6% yes, 25.9% no. (3) Nova Sco-
tia: 48.5% yes, 51.1% no. (4) New Brunswick: 61.3% yes, 38.0% no. (5) Quebec: 42.4%
yes, 55.4% no. (6) Ontario: 49.9% yes, 49.6% no. (7) Manitoba: 37.9% yes, 61.7% no. (8)
Saskatchewan: 44.5% yes, 55.1% no. (9) Alberta: 39.6% yes, 67.8% no. (10) British Co-
lumbia: 31.9% yes, 67.8% no. See Anthony Wilson Smith, et. al, What Happens Next,
MAcLEAN's, Nov. 2, 1992, at 12-14.
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Exposed to a real contest between deontological and teleo-
logical conceptions of liberty, the modern liberal response is to
assert the a priori rights of the individual and impose duties
upon all others to respect them. This approach fails to protect
the interests of cultural communities that are not manifest as
individual rights. The result is a liberty that is no different from
the sum of the individual rights that constitute it.
A rights culture is more accommodating when it imposes re-
sponsibilities upon those who exercise rights not to undermine
the cultural interests of others upon whom those rights impact.
It is more reconciliatory when those rights are not only self-re-
garding, but also regarding of others. It is more vital when re-
lating rights to responsibilities advances the interests of a plu-
ral society itself. These goals are satisfied within a revitalized
rights regime in which cultural values and interests occupy cen-
tral legal stage, in place of lasting subordination. 160
Society is truly liberal when it takes cognizance of the im-
pact of individual rights upon the traditions, customs and prac-
tices of cultural communities. That liberty is meaningful pre-
cisely because it requires that the individual contribute to the
enrichment of a society of which she is an integral part. This in-
corporation of the individual into the whole, however, does not
lead to her subordination: individual liberty remains salient to
the expression and renewal of cultural values, spawning new
values and invigorating distinct cultures. Liberty is also most
just when it fosters the dynamic expression of values, including
the interests of both cultural communities and individuals.
Arriving at an expansive liberty requires that rights take
account of cultural otherness through responsibilities toward
those others, not limited to Native Peoples. Such responsibilities
are quite different from the duty to respect the rights of an-
other. Responsibilities are owed because the interests of those
who need to benefit from them are not sufficiently acknowledged
in law. They are justified on grounds that, absent legal recogni-
160. See, eg., Michael McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on
Liberal Individualism, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1991); Michael Hartney, Some
Confusions Concerning Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 293 (1991). See
also COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE AND ON LAN-
GUAGE RIGHTS IN QUEBEC (1972) [hereinafter "GENDRON COMMISSION REPORT"]. The Com-
mission, appointed by the Government of Quebec, expressed its "faith in over-all commu-
nity good-will and . . . in the readiness of a heretofore socially and economically
privileged 'Anglo-Saxon! minority to co-operate with good heart in the community recog-
nition of legitimate social and economic aspirations of the French-speaking majority of
the Province! Id. at 85.
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tion of them, the liberty of society as a whole is detrimentally
affected.
This article's aim has been to promote solidarity between
Western liberal and Native conceptions of liberty by conciliating
among their different values and interests. Its guiding motiva-
tion has been to conceive of rights in light of responsibilities
that take account of cultural distinctiveness. Its conviction has
been that different peoples share this earth, each embodies its
own cultural values, and the values of none ought summarily to
trump the values of others. In not having an exclusive place on
this earth, no culture has an irreversible right to everything it
happens to find here. None, too, has the unrestricted right to
determine the common good wholly as it deems right, at the ex-
pense of the interests of others. "[W]e have the right to look af-
ter all life on this earth. We share land in common, not only
among ourselves but with the animals and everything that lives
in our land. It is our responsibility. Each generation must fulfill
its responsibility under the law of the Creator."161
However much Native Peoples can benefit from Western
technology in advancing their interests, Western Liberals have
much to learn from Native Peoples about preserving the earth
in the exercise of liberal rights. After all, it is Native Peoples
who have taught, for centuries, that the benefit of a safer and
healthier world inures to the benefit of all who occupy it, not
some who exploit it in disregard of the interest of all others.
161. Oren Lyons, Traditional Native Philosophies Relating to Aboriginal Rights, in
QuEsr FOR JusTiCE, supra note 141, at 19-20.
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